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OIL, GAS, AND

MINERAL LAW

Stuart C. Hollimon *
Robert E. Vinson, Jr.**

I.

ISSUES INVOLVING CONVEYANCING

A.

Two-Grant Theory

N Luckel v. White' and Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow 2 the Texas supreme
court overruled its decision in Alford v. Krum 3, and breathed new life
into the so-called "two-grant" theory of conveyancing in Texas.
Luckel v. White 4 involved the construction of a 1935 royalty deed under
which Mary Etta Mayes granted to L. C. Luckel, Jr., his heirs and assigns,
an undivided 1/32 royalty interest in a certain tract of land. The grant was
made subject to an existing oil and gas lease and provided that the grantee
was entitled to 1/4 of any and all royalties paid under such lease. The deed
further provided that Mayes reserved the executive right and the right to all
bonuses and rentals paid under any future oil and gas leases. The deed also
expressly stated that Luckel was entitled to 1/4 of any and all royalties reserved under any future leases. Subsequent leases covering the property provided for a 1/6 royalty, rather than 1/8, as provided in the lease existing at
the time of the grant. Mayes' successors in interest claimed that under these
leases, Luckel's successors were entitled to a 1/32 undivided royalty interest.
Luckel's successors, on the other hand, asserted entitlement to a 1/24 royalty interest under such leases.
The granting clause in the royalty deed clearly conveyed an undivided
1/32 royalty interest. However, the future lease clause was capable of being
interpreted to entitle the grantee to a different royalty interest in future
leases than that conveyed to the grantee in the granting clause. In Alford v.
Krum 5 the Texas supreme court faced a similar conflict between a granting
clause and a "future lease" clause contained in a mineral deed. In that case,
the supreme court held that the granting clause was the controlling provi* B.A., St. Olaf College; J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law, Strasburger & Price, Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., Texas Tech University; J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law,
Strasburger & Price, Dallas, Texas.
1. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 40 (Oct. 23, 1991).
2. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 48 (Oct. 23, 1991).
3. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984).
4. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 40 (Oct. 23, 1991).
5. 671 S.W.2d 870.
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sion defining the estate conveyed. 6 Applying the holding in Alford v. Krum 7
to this case, if the deed's granting clause and future lease clause were construed to be irreconcilable, the grant of a 1/32 royalty interest in the granting clause would control, and Luckel's successors would be entitled only to a
1/32 royalty interest in future leases.
The lower court had previously determined that the granting clause, habendum clause, and warranty clause of the deed conveyed a permanent fixed
1/32 royalty interest and that the future lease clause was ineffective to convey 1/4 of royalties reserved under future leases. 8 This determination was
the result of the court's effort to harmonize the various provisions of the
deed and the court's application of Alford v. Krum. 9 In harmonizing the
provisions of the deed, the court emphasized that a 1/8 landowner's royalty
had been customary at the time the deed was created and reasoned that the
parties to the deed probably contemplated that all future leases would provide for the usual and customary 1/8 landowner's royalty.10 Based on this
inference, the court held that the future lease clause was consistent with the
granting clause and simply confirmed that the grantee was being conveyed a
1/32 royalty interest, being 1/4 of the usual and customary 1/8 royalty
interest. I
Although the supreme court agreed that the parties probably contemplated that future leases would provide for the usual and customary 1/8
royalty, 12 the court disagreed with the result reached by the court of appeals.13 Noting that it is not the actual intent of the parties that governs
construction of the deed, but the intent of the parties expressed in the instrument, 14 the supreme court found that the term "one-fourth of any and all
royalties reserved under" future leases is clear and unambiguous, and had
the effect of granting to Luckel 1/4 of any and all royalties reserved under
future leases.1 5 Additionally, the court noted that one clause does not necessarily control over another simply because it is the granting clause and that
the language in the future lease clause is as effective to grant an interest in
future leases as is the formal language in the granting clause. 16 The supreme
court therefore concluded that "the court of appeals erred in 'harmonizing'
6. Id. at 872.

7. Id.
8. Luckel v. White, 792 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990), rev'd,
35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 40 (Oct. 23, 1991).
9. Id. at 490-91.
10. Id. at 490. "For many years the customary landowner's royalty was a 1/8th reservation. This practice was so common that the courts had judicial knowledge that 'the usual
royalty provided in mineral leases is one-eighth.'" Id. (quoting Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex.
92, 299 S.W.2d 904, 907 (1957); King v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192
S.W.2d 260, 262 (1946); Badger v. King, 331 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959,
writ ref'd n.r.e)).
11. Id. at 490-91.
12. Luckel, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 42.

13. Id.
14. Id. at 43.

15. Id.
16. Id.
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the 'future lease' clause to alter its clear and unambiguous meaning."' 7
The supreme court then addressed the application of its decision in Alford
v. Krum. 18 That case dealt with a mineral deed in which the granting clause
conveyed "one-half of the one-eighth interest" and the future lease clause
provided that, with regard to future leases covering the land, the grantor and
grantee would each own "a one-half interest." 1 9 The supreme court held in
Alford that the granting clause conflicted with the future lease clause and
that the granting clause, which defined the conveyed estate, controlled over
20
the future lease clause.
Reconsidering its opinion in Alford, the court concluded that it had incorrectly failed to harmonize the provisions of the deed under the four comers
rule 2' and erred in disregarding the future lease clause. 22 On this basis, the
court overruled Alford and concluded that in this case the interest conveyed
under the royalty deed at issue was 1/4 of royalties reserved under the existing and all future leases. 23 The court further concluded that since the
granting clause granted a 1/32 fixed royalty, the parties intended that the
undivided 1/4 royalty under future leases would never fall below that
amount. 24 Accordingly, Luckel's royalty interest under future leases is sub25
ject to a floor of 1/32 of production.
In JupiterOil Co. v. Snow 26 the supreme court considered similar issues in
the context of construing the size of the mineral interest conveyed under a
1918 mineral deed from J. W. and Malinda Henderson, grantors, to J. M.
Weaver, grantee.
Through a series of assignments, the interest of Weaver, the original
grantee, was conveyed to Jupiter. Snow, an oil operator, obtained oil, gas,
and mineral leases covering the lands, and proceeded to complete two producing wells under those leases. Snow failed to lease the mineral interest
held by Jupiter. Jupiter, as an unleased mineral owner, sought reimbursement from Snow for its proportionate share of the net value of the hydrocarbons produced by Snow from the property. Jupiter, claiming to own an
undivided 1/2 mineral interest in the property, alleged it was entitled to
$572,377.98, attributable to that interest after all offsets. Snow claimed that
under the granting clause of the mineral deed, Jupiter merely owned a 1/16
mineral interest and was entitled to only $59,922.60, allocable to that interest after all offsets. The trial court held that Jupiter owned a 1/2 mineral
17. Id.

18. Id. at 43 (discussing Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870).
19. Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 871-72.
20. Id. at 873-74.

21. Luckel, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 44. The four comers rule requires the court to construe
the deed according to the intent of the parties as expressed solely within the instrument, giving
credit to every phrase and reconciling any conflicting clauses in an attempt to harmonize all
language appearing in the instrument. Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904, 907

(1957).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 44-45.
Id.
35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 48 (Oct. 23, 1991).
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interest in the tract. 27 The court 28
of appeals, however, reversed based upon
an application of Alford v. Krum.
Reading the deed as a whole, 29 the supreme court found that the granting
clause in the 1918 deed conveyed to Weaver a 1/16 interest in the mineral
estate, and in the absence of further language in the deed, the fee simple title
as to 15/16 of the minerals would revert to the Hendersons upon the termination of the then-existing lease. 30 However, the future lease clause under
the deed conveyed the Hendersons' possibility of reverter with regard to
7/16 of the minerals. 3' This had the effect of expanding Jupiter's interest in
the mineral estate from 1/16 to a full 1/2 upon termination of the thenexisting lease. 32 Under this analysis, the supreme court held that the deed
33
was unambiguous, and that none of its clauses irreconcilably conflicted.
Accordingly, the court held that the court of appeals erred in resorting to
rules of construction, such as the repugnant to the grant rule. 34 The

supreme court reversed the court of appeals' judgment, and affirmed the
35
judgment of the trial court.
B. Open Mine Doctrine
One of the issues in the will construction case of McGill v. Johnson 36 was
the application of the open mine doctrine 37 to the particular facts involved.
27. Id. at 49.

28. Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 802 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990), rev'd, 35 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 48 (Oct. 23, 1991). The appellate court reluctantly followed the Alford case, respectfully suggesting that the supreme court should re-examine its holding. Id. at 358.
29. The deed's granting clause conveyed "all that certain undivided 1/16 interest in and
to all the oil, gas, and other minerals." Id. at 355-56. The deed's "subject to clause," however, stated that "[i]t is the intention of the parties in the conveyance that the grantee herein is
to receive 1/16 part of the oil, gas, or other mineral of whatsoever kind and character produced by the holder of the lease now on said land, that grantors herein now intend to convey
1/2 of the interest they now have in any such production under said lease." Id. at 356. The
deed's future lease clause provided that "it is the intention of the grantors herein that in the
event said lease [the then-existing lease covering the property] is forfeited, then in that event
the grantee is to have and hold an equal undivided one half of all such minerals." Id.
30. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 50.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The Texas supreme court expressly held that Alford v. Krum was inapplicable.
Id. at 48.
35. Id. at 48.
36. 799 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1990).
37. The court explained the open mine doctrine as follows:
The open mine doctrine provides a limited exception to the general rule that a
life tenant is liable to the remaindermen for waste if he uses the corpus of the
estate. Texas courts have applied the open mine doctrine only to leases that the
testator executed and that are in effect at his death. Moose v. Vines, 474 S.W.2d
437 (Tex. 1971). The open mine doctrine rests on a presumption of intent that
when the creator of the life estate gave no direction as to disposition of the
proceeds from open mines, he intended for the life tenant to have the same degree of control over such proceeds as that of the testator. The effect of the open
mine doctrine is that all royalties, bonuses, and income derived from these royalties and bonuses is not treated as corpus of the life estate, but rather, belongs to
the life tenant. Clyde v. Hamilton, 414 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1967).
799 S.W.2d at 676.

OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL LAW

1992]

1969

Prior to his death, the testator in that case executed ten oil, gas, and mineral
leases as to his interest. Upon his death, the testator's interest in the leases
was transferred to a testamentary trust. The testator's son, Johnson, was the
income beneficiary of that trust. The trustee was specifically authorized by
the trust documents to execute oil, gas, and mineral leases, and the trustee
granted two leases during the term of the trust. The trust terminated by its
own provisions on Johnson's fortieth birthday. At that time, in accordance
with the provisions of the will, all of the personal property formerly held in
trust was transferred to Johnson, and the real property was placed in a life
estate of which Johnson was the life tenant, with the remainder passing to
the testator's sisters. After creation of the life estate, Johnson received all
bonus and royalty payments under the oil, gas, and mineral leases as his own
property.
The McGills succeeded to the interest of one of the testator's sisters. They
claimed that under a general rule of life tenancy, Johnson committed waste
by dissipating the corpus of the life estate by taking royalties and bonuses
under the leases without sharing them with the remaindermen. The McGills
recognized that the open mine doctrine was an exception to this general rule
but claimed that it did not apply in this case because the life estate was not
created until after termination of an intervening trust.
In this case of first impression, the Texas supreme court held that the
intervening trust did not preclude application of the open mine doctrine
since the trustee was expressly authorized to execute oil, gas, and mineral
leases during the term of the trust.38 This holding was further based on the
fact that under the provisions of the will, the testator intended for his son to
receive all of the personal property from the estate and to use the real property during the son's lifetime. 39 Therefore, the court concluded that Johnson did not commit waste.40
C. Mineral Interest/Royalty Interest Distinction
At issue in Neel v. Alpar Resources, Inc.4 1 was the classification of a certain reservation in a warranty deed as a mineral interest or a royalty interest.
In 1938, the Federal Land Bank of Houston (FLB) granted a warranty deed
to C.A. Wilhelm, reserving a certain interest. 42 Nan Shaw succeeded to the
38. Id. at 677.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 676-77.
Id. at 677.
797 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
The reservation provided:
SAVE AND EXCEPT an undivided one-sixteenth (1/16th) interest (same being
one half (1/2) of the usual (1/8) royalty) in and to all of the oil, gas and other
minerals, in, to and under and that may be produced from the land herein conveyed to be paid or delivered unto said Bank as its own property free of cost to it
from royalty oil, gas and/or other minerals FOREVER, together with the right
of ingress and egress, at all times for the purpose of storing, treating, marketing
and removing the same therefrom. Said interest in and to said minerals hereby
reserved is a non-participating royalty interest and shall not participate in the
bonus paid for any oil, gas or other mineral lease covering said land, nor shall it
participate in the money rentals which may be paid to extend the time within
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interest of Wilhelm under the deed. In 1964, Shaw conveyed the property
by deed to LaRue Young, reserving an undivided 1/2 interest in and to all of
the oil, gas, and other minerals in and under, and that may be produced
from the land. This deed did not mention the outstanding interest reserved
by the FLB. The Neels succeeded to the interest reserved by Shaw. In 1971
and 1972, the Neels and the successors of Young granted separate oil, gas,
and mineral leases to Alpar's predecessor in interest. These leases provided
for a 1/8 royalty and contained a proportionate reduction clause.
The Neels claimed that the interest reserved by the FLB was an undivided
1/16 mineral interest rather than an undivided 1/16 royalty interest. According to the Neels, they owned an undivided 7/16 mineral interest. It was
undisputed that Young's successors owned an undivided 1/2 mineral interest. Under the Neels' theory, they would be entitled to 7/16 of 1/8 royalty
interest under their lease held by Alpar, and the FLB would be entitled to
1/16 of 1/8 royalty interest. Alpar, on the other hand, asserted that the
1938 reservation entitled the FLB to 1/16 royalty interest, being 1/2 of 1/8
royalty. Consequently, it was Alpar's position that the Neels would be entitled to nothing since the Neels only owned 1/2 mineral interest and the
lease provided for 1/8 royalty.
The Neels' claim was based on several contentions. First, they contended
that the interest reserved by the FLB could not be a royalty interest because
the deed did not contain the limiting language that the 1/16 interest would
be paid from actual production. The court, however, stated that the words
"from actual production" are not exclusive words of art which must be used
in order to reserve a royalty rather than a mineral interest. 43 Instead, the
parties' intent, as expressed in the deed, controls. 4 The court noted that the
description of the reserved interest in the case at hand made it clear that the
45
reserved interest would be paid out of actual production.
Second, the Neels pointed to the FLB's reservation of the right of ingress
and egress as indicating that it was reserving a mineral interest rather than a
royalty interest. Noting that the reservation of ingress and egress was limited for the purposes of storing, treating, marketing, and removing royalty
oil, gas, or other minerals, the court held that such reservation was not inconsistexit with a reserved royalty interest and did not necessarily indicate an
46
intent to reserve a mineral interest.
Third, the Neels asserted that other documents, such as the FLB's deed of
trust, the FLB's release of the deed of trust, and all subsequent deeds out of
the FLB, should be examined to ascertain the true nature of the reserved
which a well may be begun under the terms of any lease covering said land. In
the event oil, gas and/or other minerals are produced from said land, then said
Bank shall receive a full one-sixteenth (1/16th) portion thereof as its own prop-

erty, to be paid or delivered to said Bank free of cost to it.
Id. at 362 (emphasis omitted).

43. Id. at 364.
44. Id.

45. Id.
46. Id. at 365.
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interest. The court rejected this contention as well, holding that the deed is
the final "repository" of the terms and conditions to which the parties have
agreed, and, in the absence of fraud or mistake, the deed alone will be
deemed to express the true intent of the parties thereto. 47 Since there were
no allegations of fraud or mistake, the appellate court held the evidence of
the provisions of the collateral documents had been properly excluded by the
48
trial court.
The court held that the FLB reservation was a 1/16 non-participating
royalty interest, being 1/2 of the usual 1/8 royalty.4 9 The Neels, therefore,
owned a 1/2 mineral interest burdened by FLB's 1/16 non-participating
royalty interest.50 Since the oil, gas, and mineral lease executed by the Neels
only provided for 1/8 royalty, the Neels were not entitled to any royalty
5
payments under the lease. '
D. Adverse Possession
The common source of title in a trespass to try title suit was disputed in
Thomas v. Henderson.52 At issue was the mineral interest in a 100 acre tract
of land. The plaintiffs claimed title to the tract, including the mineral estate,
by virtue of adverse possession by the plaintiffs' grandparents, Ann and
Henry Ford, since December 1938. They alleged that the Fords lived,
farmed, and raised cattle on the fenced tract since 1939. The plaintiffs
pleaded the 3 year, the 10 year and the 25 year statutes of limitations.53 The
defendants asserted title to the minerals under the east half of the tract as a
result of warranty deeds and mineral deeds. They alleged that the minerals
under the east half had been severed from the surface tract prior to 1939.
At trial, the defendants introduced a 1909 general warranty deed from the
Fords to W.J. Simmons and a 1932 mineral deed as to the east half of the
tract from Simmons (by an authorized agent) to the defendants' predecessor
in interest. The defendants additionally introduced a 1910 deed from Simmons to the Fords which covered the west half of the tract. The plaintiffs
claimed that these instruments were inadmissible. The trial court admitted
these documents over objection and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to
the minerals in the west half of the tract and to the entire surface estate and
54
the defendants were entitled to the minerals in the east half.

On appeal the plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that the title instruments introduced by the defendants were irrelevant and a "nullity" because
the defendants did not establish that the Fords had legal title to the tract at
the time they executed the deed to Simmons. The plaintiffs' position was
47. Id. at 366 (citing Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex.
1982) and Carter v. Barclay, 476 S.W.2d 909, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, no writ)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 367.
52. 795 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ denied).
53. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.024, .026-.028 (Vernon 1986).
54. Thomas, 795 S.W.2d at 848.
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that the instruments offered by defendants had no effect unless the defendants could trace the Fords' title in 1909 back to the sovereignty of the soil.
The defendants contended that they were not required to prove title back to
the sovereignty of the soil because it was only necessary to establish title
back to a common source. According to defendants, Simmons was the common source of title because the defendants were claiming title under a mineral deed from Simmons and the plaintiffs were claiming title as heirs of the
Fords, who were Simmons' grantees.
The appellate court concluded that the defendants had established a common source of title and that the documents introduced by defendant were
properly admitted. 55 Since the mineral estate had effectively been severed
from the surface estate in the east half prior to any claim of adverse possession, the court applied "well-established" rules to conclude that the plaintiffs
did not adversely possess the minerals in the east half.56 Specifically, according to Texas law, after the severance of the surface estate from the mineral
estate, "mere possession of one will not ripen into a limitation title to the
other." 57 Limitations
cannot be successfully asserted against the owner of a severed mineral
estate or mineral interest by a surface holder when the surface holder or
surface owner perfects his title to the surface by taking actual possession of the surface but fails to take actual possession and use of the
minerals for the statutory required period. 58
Applying these principles, the court affirmed the trial court's award of
title. 59
II.

ISSUES INVOLVING OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL LEASES

A. Royalty Due on Actual Production
In a case of first impression in Texas courts, the San Antonio court of
appeals held in Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni60 that, as a matter of law, the standard royalty clause in an oil, gas, and mineral lease does not apply to proceeds paid in settlement6 of claims arising under a take-or-pay provision in a
gas purchase contract. 1
The Bruni Mineral Trust in 1974 drafted and entered into an oil, gas, and
mineral lease, as lessor, with Killam & Hurd, Ltd., as lessee. The lease was
later assigned by Killam & Hurd, Ltd. to Killam Oil Company (Killam) and
Hurd Enterprises, Ltd. (Hurd) in equal parts. Two of the wells completed
on the lease produced gas that was sold to United Texas Transmission Company (UTTCO) pursuant to a gas purchase contract. The gas contract con55. Id. at 850.

56. Id. at 851.
57. Id. (citing Watkins v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 231 S.W.2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1950, no writ)).
58. Id. (citing Carminati v. Fenoglio, 267 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
59. Id. at 851-52.
60. 806 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
61. Id. at 268.
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tamined a take-or-pay provision obligating UTTCO to take a certain specified
annual quantity of gas or pay for gas not taken. UTTCO failed to take or
pay for the minimum quantity but later paid Killam and Hurd $4 million
and $2.8 million, respectively, to settle their take-or-pay claims.
Thereafter, the Trust sued Killam and Hurd seeking a royalty share of the
settlement proceeds received from UTTCO. The Trust alleged a variety of
causes of action, including breach of marketing duty, breach of duty of good
faith and fair dealing, conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, and equitable
reformation. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Trust, concluding that, as a matter of law, the gas royalty clause applied to take-or-pay settlement payments. 62 The trial court denied the Trust's motion for summary judgment
with regard to its claims for breach of covenant to manage and market, and
63
breach of duty of good faith. Killam and Hurd appealed.
Noting that the royalty provision in the oil, gas, and mineral lease determines the royalties to which a lessor is entitled, the appellate court examined
the particular royalty provision at issue. 64 In the absence of prior Texas case
law on the issue of whether a stated royalty clause applies to take-or-pay
settlements, the court turned to Texas cases dealing with similar issues.
The court first considered Monsanto Co. v. Tyrrell,65 where the issue was
whether an advance payment for gas production constituted "recovery from
production. ' '6 6 That issue arose because the oil and gas lease provided for
the initial royalty to increase when the lessee recovered its total drilling costs
from a stated percentage of production. Under the gas purchase contract
entered into by the lessee, the gas purchaser made an advance payment to
the lessee as partial payment for the gas committed to the purchaser. The
lessor contended that the advance payments should be applied as an immediate credit for the recovery of well costs, thereby triggering the increased royalties. The court, however, ruled that the advance payments were not
"recovery from production" and, therefore, they would not be accounted for
by the lessee as recovery of expenses until the associated gas was actually
67
produced or extracted from the ground.
Similarly, the court considered the decision in Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 68 where the royalty clause at issue provided for royalty to be based upon
a percentage of the gas produced from the land as related to either the
62. Id. at 265-66.
63. Id. at 266.
64. The pertinent provision stated:
The royalties to be paid by lessee are: ... (b) on gas, including casinghead gas
and all gaseous substances, produced from said land and sold or used off the
premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or other product therefrom, the market value at the mouth of the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount
realized from such ....
Id. at 266 (emphasis omitted).
65. 537 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. 806 S.W.2d at 267.
67. 537 S.W.2d at 137.
68. 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
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amount realized for the sale of minerals at the well or market value if the
minerals were sold off the premises. 69 The lessor in that case contended that
the gas was sold when the gas contracts became effective. The Texas
supreme court disagreed, holding that the term "produced," as used in the
lease, meant a physical extraction from the land and the term "sold" meant
delivered. 70 The lessee's obligation under the royalty clause was therefore
held to be unaffected by the gas contracts. 7'
The court also considered a recent federal case in which the Fifth Circuit
held that a standard gas royalty clause does not apply to take-or-pay payments because "'royalties are not owed unless and until actual production,
the severance of minerals from the formation, occurs.' "72
In the present case, the court found that the royalty provision applied to
gas actually produced or physically extracted from the soil and that the takeor-pay settlement payments by UTTCO were for gas not produced. 73 Additionally, the court emphasized that the Trust drafted the lease and it could
have included a provision specifically allowing for royalty to be paid on takeor-pay settlements.7 4 The court did observe, however, that gas not actually
produced remains in the ground and that the Trust will be entitled to royalties when and if the gas is actually produced. 75
B. Accrued Royalty and Lease Termination
In Marifarms Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Westhoff 76 the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's judgment awarding a royalty owner recovery of accrued royalties in the amount of $347.00 and terminating the oil, gas, and mineral
lease under which those royalties were payable due to non-production of
hydrocarbons for a period of 84 days. 77
1.

Notice of Change of Interest

In Marifarms Oil & Gas, Inc. Marifarms Oil & Gas 1977 (the Partnership)
was the working interest owner under the oil, gas, and mineral lease at issue.
Marifarms Oil & Gas, Inc. (the Corporation) was the operator of the lease.
Westhoff purchased the property burdened by the lease in 1986. Thereafter,
Westhoff sent notice to the Corporation of the change of interest, believing
that the Corporation held the working interest under the lease because the
local taxing authority records listed the Corporation as both the operator of
the lease and the working interest owner. Westhoff sent this notice to the
Corporation's mailing address listed in the taxing records. This was the for69.
70.
71.
72.
Hodel,
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

806 S.W.2d at 267.
613 S.W.2d at 244.
Id.at 245.
Killam Oil Co., 806 S.W.2d at 267 (quoting Diamond Shamrock Exploration Corp. v.
853 F.2d 1159, 1165 (5th Cir. 1988)).
Id.
Id.at 267-68.
Id.at 268.
802 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
Id.at 124.
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mer address of the Corporation but remained the residence address of the
Corporation's sole employee. Although the Corporation's address had
changed, the Corporation had not advised the taxing authority, nor had the
Corporation corrected the taxing authority's mistake in listing it on its
records as the working interest owner of the lease. Thereafter, having received no royalty payments under the lease, Westhoff filed suit to recover all
of proaccrued royalties and to cancel the lease due to an alleged cessation
78
duction. Westhoff was awarded judgment by the trial court.
On appeal, the Partnership and the Corporation (collectively
"Marifarms") claimed that the trial court had erred in rendering judgment
for recovery of the accrued royalties because Westhoff had only notified the
Corporation (the operator of the lease) of the change of ownership interest
and had failed to notify the Partnership (the true owner of the working interest) of this development. On the basis of the facts stated above, the court of
appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's
judgment awarding recovery of the royalties because such evidence demonstrated that the Corporation appeared to be the owner of the working interin attempting to notify the
est and that Westhoff had exercised due diligence
79
Corporation of the change in ownership.
2. Cessation of Production
With regard to the lease termination issue, Marifarms contended that the
trial court erred in terminating the lease because there was insufficient evidence that the well had ceased to produce in paying quantities. The evidence, however, established that the well had been shut-in for a period of 84
days from June 3 to August 25, 1986. In addressing this issue, the court
noted that a lease will not terminate for lack of production resulting from a
shut-in well if the shut-in royalty is paid in compliance with an applicable
lease provision. 80 In such circumstances, however, the court noted that the
shut-in royalty must be paid in advance of the expiration of the time period
provided by the cessation of production clause in order to perpetuate the
lease. 8 1 In this instance, no shut-in royalty was paid by Marifarms prior to
the expiration of the sixty day period provided for under the lease's cessation
of production clause, and in fact, no shut-in royalty had ever been paid by
Marifarms. Thus, for approximately eighty-four days, there had been a total
absence of production and no shut-in royalty had been paid. On this basis,
judgment declaring that the lease
the court of appeals affirmed the trial court
82
had terminated by its own provisions.
In Bachler v. Rosenthal8 3 the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
granting of a summary judgment for the lessees which decreed as a matter of
law that an oil, gas, and mineral lease had not terminated due to cessation of
78. Id.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 125-26.
Id. at 126.
798 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
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production.8 4 The lease in question had been extended beyond the primary
term as result of actual production. Thereafter, production declined and actually ceased for a period of time prior to being restored as the result of
reworking operations. The lessors filed suit claiming that the lease had terminated because production had completely ceased for more than sixty days
before reworking operations were conducted. The lease contained a typical
clause providing that the lease would terminate upon the cessation of production for more than sixty consecutive days beyond the primary term.85
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals distinguished between a
lease termination based upon a cessation of production in paying quantities
and a lease termination based upon a total cessation of production.8 6 With
regard to the former, the court stated that a determination of whether there
has been a termination of the lease depends upon: (1) whether revenues
from production have exceeded operating and marketing expenses over a
reasonable period of time; and (2) whether under relevant circumstances a
reasonable prudent operator would, "for purposes of making a profit and not
merely for speculation, continue to operate [the lease]." 87T The court noted
that a determination of whether a lease has terminated due to a total cessation of production, however, simply requires a determination of whether the
lease has completely failed to produce hydrocarbons for the period of time
(typically sixty days) provided for under the clause contained in the lease.88
Thus, if there has been a total cessation of production for the time specified in the lease and an absence of further drilling or reworking operations,
the lease terminates automatically.8 9 If, on the other hand, production from
the lease has not completely ceased but instead has simply been in such small
amounts as to cause the lease to be operated at a loss, the lease may be
declared terminated only if such operating losses have continued for an unreasonable length of time and a reasonable prudent operator would not continue to operate the lease for the purpose of making a profit. 90
Applying these principles to the summary judgment record, the court of
appeals held that the evidence did not conclusively establish the absence of a
period of sixty consecutive days with no actual production. 9' In this regard,
the summary judgment evidence established that the lease in question produced one barrel of oil in January 1987, zero barrels of oil in February 1987,
and twelve barrels of oil in March 1987. The summary judgment evidence,
84. Id. at 647.
85. The lease provided:
[I]f after discovery and production of oil, gas or other mineral [on said land], the
production thereof should cease from any cause, this lease shall not terminate if
Lessee commences operations for drilling or reworking within sixty (60) days
thereafter ....
Id. at 648 (emphasis omitted).
86. Id. at 649.
87. Id. (quoting Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684, 690-91 (1959)).
88. Id. at 650.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 649-50.
91. Id. at 651.
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however, did not establish the exact day in January that the one barrel of oil
had been produced and did not establish the exact day or days in March that
the twelve barrels of oil had been produced. As a result, the court concluded
that the summary judgment record left open the possibility that the January
production and the March production had occurred more than 60 days
92
apart and did not conclusively establish that the lease had not terminated.
C. Executives
1. Duty of Executives
In Mims v. Bea1 93 the court of appeals affirmed a trial court judgment
that the owners of the executive right breached their obligation to the nonexecutives by leasing the mineral property to their son on terms which did
not reflect current market conditions. 94 In 1947, the Bealls' parents sold
approximately 200 acres of land to John and Chattie Mims, retaining an
undivided 1/4 nonparticipating royalty interest. Some time after that, the
Mims granted an oil, gas, and mineral lease to Sesco Production Company
covering the property. Such lease, which provided for 1/8 royalty and 1/8
overriding bonus royalty, apparently expired prior to 1979. In 1979, oil and
gas exploration activities in the area of the 200 acre tract increased. That
same year, the Mims granted an oil, gas, and mineral lease to their son,
Angus Mims. This lease provided for a 1/8 royalty and no cash bonus.
Shortly thereafter, Angus Mims assigned the lease to a third party in return
for a 1/16 overriding royalty interest. The Bealls filed suit against John,
Chattie, and Angus Mims, alleging that their conduct constituted a breach
of executive duty. Following a jury trial, the court rendered judgment in
favor of the Bealls, awarding actual and exemplary damages and imposing a
constructive trust on part of the overriding royalty interest obtained by
Angus. 95 The Mims appealed.
The court of appeals recognized that one who exercises executive rights to
lease or develop mineral property owes a duty of utmost good faith to the
non-executives 96 and held that such duty is equivalent to a fiduciary obligation. 97 The court then examined the evidence to determine whether it was
sufficient to support the jury finding that the Mims breached their duty to
the Bealls.
The court found sufficient evidence of a breach of the executive's duty in
three respects. 98 First, as fiduciaries, the court held that the Mims were
prohibited from self dealing and from dealing with other persons whose interests are closely identified with their own, such as their son, and that this
was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the Mims engaged in self
92. Id.
93. 810 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
94. Id. at 882.

95. Id. at 878.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 878-79 (citing Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984)).

98. Id. at 880.
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dealing by leasing to their son. 99 Second, the court held that the evidence
was sufficient for the jury to find that the Mims had failed to negotiate a
lease based on current market terms.10 0 In this respect, the court noted that
the geographic area was a "hot" location for mineral development in 1979
and that some tracts in the area had been leased for larger royalties than the
1/8 royalty provided for under the Mims lease. 10 1 The fact that Angus
Mims almost immediately marketed the lease to a third party for an overriding royalty interest was further evidence that the 1/8 royalty was less than
what the market would bear in terms of a royalty burden, and, in fact, John
Mims admitted that there had been no arms length negotiation for the lease.
Third, the court held that the executive right owner failed to exact for the
non-participating royalty owners every benefit he exacted for himself in that
the overriding royalty interest received by Angus had not been shared with
the Bealls. 10 2 Because Angus was considered as having the same interest as
his parents, the Bealls were deprived of 1/4 interest in the overriding royalty
10 3
reserved by Angus.
Although the court recognized that Angus did not owe a fiduciary duty to
the Bealls, 10 4 it nevertheless found that Angus could be liable to the Bealls
for his participation in his parents' breach of executive duty, I05 reasoning
that if the lessee "agrees with the executive to an arrangement made for the
purpose of excluding or minimizing the benefits of an outstanding or nonparticipating interest owner, the lessee can be held liable to the injured third
party."'106 In fact, the court noted that some authorities would impose liability even if the lessee should have only reasonably been aware that the executive was acting in breach of his duty.107 The evidence showed that Angus
had at least constructive notice that his parents were breaching their executive duty.10 8 Accordingly, the court found sufficient evidence to support the
jury's liability finding. 1 9 The remainder of the opinion focused on remedies
awarded by the trial court. 110
2. Appointment of Executives
In Hawkins v. Twin Montana, Inc.'1 1 the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's interlocutory order appointing a receiver for the purpose of exercising the executive right with regard to certain property.1 1 2 The appellants owned the surface of a tract of land, the right to execute oil and gas
99. Id.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 880-81.

Id. at 881.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 881-82.

111. 810 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1991, no writ).
112. Id.at 443.
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leases with regard to the tract, and the right to receive all bonuses and rentals under any such lease. The appellees owned the non-executive mineral
interest in the tract. Twin Montana, the appellee, petitioned the trial court
for a judgment declaring the respective rights of the parties and for the apthe pendency of the
pointment of a receiver of the executive rights. During
13
lawsuit, the trial court appointed such a receiver.1
The appellants appealed from the trial court's order on several grounds.
Raising some peripheral issues, the appellants claimed that the trial court
had erred in appointing a receiver in this case because: (1) the trial court
had no authority to impose an equitable receivership under the facts of this
case, particularly when, as here, the appointment of a receiver was the primary, not ancillary, relief sought by the plaintiff; and (2) the appellees had
failed to establish that any well drilled on the property would yield a profit
for the lessee.
The court of appeals made short work of these contentions. With regard
to the former contention, the court held that the receivership at issue was
not an equity receivership but a statutory receivership imposed under the
Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, 1 4 which authorizes the appointment of a receiver in an action between parties jointly interested in the property and that the parties had the requisite joint interest in the property to
enable the trial court to grant the statutory relief."15 As to the matter of
whether the receivership was the primary or ancillary relief sought by the
appellees, the court noted that in addition to the appointment of a receiver,
the appellees were seeking permanent relief in the form of declaratory judgment specifying the rights of the parties as between the executives and nonexecutives and, for this reason, rejected the appellants' contention." 1 6 With
respect to the claim that the receivership had been improperly ordered because the appellees had failed to plead and prove that any wells drilled on
the property would be sufficiently productive to make a profit for the lessee,
the court held that the profitability of operations under any prospective lease
was not a requirement for the granting of a receivership or the7execution of
any such lease and thus easily dispatched this claim as well." 1
At the heart of the appeal lay the appellants' contention that the trial
court erred in appointing a receiver to execute an oil and gas lease covering
the premises because after suit was filed they had in fact granted a lease
covering the property to L.F. Jones Company after first rejecting appellees'
offer to lease the property. The Jones lease provided for a primary term of
two years, a 1/8 royalty, $100 per acre bonus, and surface damages in the
amount of $3,000 for the first well and $1,000 for each additional well. The
lease offered by the appellees provided for a primary term of one year, a 1/4
royalty, $100 per acre bonus, and $500 per well for surface damages.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 64 (Vernon 1986).
Hawkins, 810 S.W.2d at 444.
Id. at 444-45.
Id. at 445.
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The trial court determined that the Jones lease failed to adequately protect
the appellees and concluded that the executives had breached their fiduciary
duty by entering into the lease." 18 The appellants claimed that in this regard
the trial court had erred because the executives had complied with the only
express condition to the exercise of the executive right, which was that any
lease executed on the property had to provide for a royalty of at least 1/8.
In addressing this point, the court held that circumstances may require more
of an executive than mere compliance with express conditions in order for
the executive to discharge its duties in good faith. 1 9 On this basis, the court
affirmed that the executives had not acted in good faith when they leased the
property for a 1/8 royalty instead of accepting the appellees' lease offer
120
which included a 1/4 royalty.
D. Mistake of Release of Lease
In Hayes v. ETS Enterprises,Inc. 121 the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment granting rescission of an instrument by which a lessee released a producing oil, gas, and mineral lease on the grounds that the release
was the product of mistake.' 22 Cecil and Emma Jean Meadows, as lessors,
granted an oil, gas, and mineral lease to Tom L. Scott, Inc., as lessee. Scott's
interest in the lease was later assigned to Pogo Producing Company. Hayes
and others owned undivided mineral interests in the Meadows Tract, subject
to the oil, gas, and mineral lease.
Pogo Producing Company acquired the working interest under such lease.
On February 20, 1985, Pogo farmed out its interest in the lease to ETS, and
on April 5, 1985, ETS commenced drilling operations on the tract. Neither
the farmout arrangement nor information regarding the commencement of
drilling operations was contained in Pogo's lease file although it was Pogo's
normal office procedure to make a notation of such information in the file.
Without the benefit of such information, a Pogo employee prepared a release
of lease and forwarded it to Kenneth Good, the Pogo employee authorized
to sign such releases. Good executed the release of the lease on May 14,
1985, during the course of drilling operations. Subsequently, on June 24,
1985, Pogo executed an instrument entitled "Revocation and Rescission of
Release of Oil and Gas Lease." By such instrument, Pogo stated that it had
not intended to release the lease. ETS completed a producing well on the
tract in December 1985, and, on March 19, 1986, Pogo assigned ETS the
interest it earned under the farmout, reserving an overriding royalty interest.
ETS brought an action against Hayes and the other mineral interest owners seeking a declaratory judgment that Pogo's release of the lease was ineffective because it was the result of a mistake. ETS then sought and obtained
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 809 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1991, writ denied).
122. Id. at 660.
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a favorable summary judgment in this regard. 123 Hayes and the other interest owners appealed.
On appeal, Hayes claimed that the summary judgment evidence did not
establish that there was any mistake in the execution of the release. Hayes
relied on the deposition testimony of Kenneth Good, who testified that at
the time he executed the release, he intended to do so, and that, by his execution of the release, he intended to surrender Pogo's interest in the lease.
Hayes asserted that this evidence established that the execution of the release
was an intentional act and not a mistake, or at least that this evidence raised
a fact issue as to whether there was a mistake. The appellate court rejected
this contention, noting that the question of Good's intent in actually executing the document was not an issue. 124 Rather, the court described the issue
as being whether "subsequent to the execution of the farmout agreement
from Pogo to ETS, and while ETS was in the process of drilling a test well
... an employee of Pogo mistakenly and inadvertently prepared, executed
and sent for filing a document entitled 'Release of Oil and Gas Leases.' ,,125
The court found that the summary judgment proof established an objective
explanation for the mistake and this was sufficient to establish that the exe12 6
cution of the release was the result of a mistake.
Hayes also claimed that ETS failed to show that:
(1) the mistake is of so great consequence that to enforce the contract
as made would be unconscionable; (2) the mistake relates to a material
feature of the contract; (3) the mistake must have been made regardless
of the exercise of ordinary care; and (4) the parties can be placed in
status quo in the equity sense, i.e., rescission must not result
in preju127
dice to the other party except for the loss of his bargain.
Hayes asserted that ETS's summary judgment evidence failed to establish as
a matter of law that the mistake would have been made despite the exercise
of ordinary care. The appellate court, however, held that ordinary negligence does not bar the granting of equitable relief' 28 and, adopting the reasoning of Oklahoma courts 129 on this issue, held that a lessee which has
inadvertently executed a release of lease is:
entitled to cancellation of the release unless (1) the cancellation would
offend the rights of an innocent purchaser for value or (2) another
party in good faith and in innocent reliance, i.e., reliance without notice
or knowledge of facts which would suggest the probability of an invalid
release, had made a position alteration that could not be reversed with123. Id. at 654.
124. Id. at 657.

125. Id.
126. Id. at 658.
127. Id. at 658. Hayes asserted that the case of Roland v. McCullough, 561 S.W.2d 207,
213 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), required Twin Montana to establish
these elements in order to be entitled to the relief sought. Hayes, 809 S.W.2d at 658.
128. Id. at 659 (citing James T. Taylor and Son, Inc. v. Arlington Ind. School Dist., 160
Tex. 617, 335 S.W.2d 371, 375 (1960)).

129. See Armbruster v. Thetis Energy Corp., 675 P.2d 476 (Okla. App. 1983); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Flag-Redfern Oil Co., 522 P.2d 651 (Okla. App. 1973).
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out significant prejudice. 130
Finding that the summary judgment evidence in the case was sufficient to
show that Hayes and other interest owners made no detrimental position
change in innocent reliance on the Pogo release,' 3 ' the court affirmed the
132
trial court's summary judgment.
III.

ISSUES INVOLVING POOLING
A.

Compulsory Pooling

The Texas supreme court in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pend Oreille
Oil & Gas Co., Inc. '33 held that the Railroad Commission has the statutory
authority to force pool, in a single proceeding under the Mineral Interest
Pooling Act (MIPA), 134 separate deposits of gas in man-made communication through a common wellbore. 135 Pend Oreille is the working interest
owner and unit operator of the Bennett Unit in the Limes (Wilcox 9900)
Field in Live Oak County, Texas. Bill Forney is the lessee of land immediately adjacent to the unit. The Limes Field consists of two separate reservoirs, the Main Sand and the Stray Sand. Most of the Bennett Unit is within
the Limes Field, but only a small portion of the Forney lease is in the field.
Production allowables for the producing well in the unit were based on surface acreage.
In November 1983, Pend Oreille filed application with the Texas Railroad
Commission for determination of the productive limits of the field and
sought allowables based on productive net acre-feet of reserves. In December 1983, Forney made a written offer to Pend Oreille and other interest
owners in the unit to voluntarily pool Forney's productive acreage with productive acreage in the Bennett Unit to form a new unit. Forney proposed
that the producing portions of such unit be based on the outcome of Pend
Oreille's application or, alternatively, on agreement between the parties.
Pend Oreille never responded to Forney's offer.
Forney filed application with the Texas Railroad Commission to force
pool under MIPA. Forney's application sought an order establishing a 340
acre unit composed of producing acreage from the Bennett Unit and the
Forney tracts. In April 1984, the Railroad Commission held hearings on
Forney's application. In May 1984, the Commission temporarily abated further MIPA proceedings until resolution of Pend Oreille's productive acreage
application and entered an interim order that
(1) established that 289 acres of the Bennett Unit and 36 acres of the
Forney acreage are productive in the Limes Field, (2) granted the Bennett Unit a production allowable equal to that which would be granted
130. Hayes, 809 S.W.2d at 659 (citing Armbruster v. Thetis Energy Corp., 675 P.2d 476
(Okla. App. 1983); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Flag-Redfern Oil Co., 522 P.2d 651 (Okla. App. 1973)).

131. Hayes, 809 S.W.2d at 659.
132. Id. at 660.
133. 817 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. 1991).
134. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-.112 (Vernon 1978).
135. Pend Oreille, 817 S.W.2d at 37.
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a 325-acre unit in the Limes Field, pending a final order on the application, (3) provided that any allowable increment granted in the order
would be rescinded and subject to make-up if the Commission denied
Forney's application, (4) ordered that proceeds attributable to the production allowable for acreage in excess of the 266 acres currently assigned to this well be paid into an escrow account, and (5) stated that
the interim
order would be superseded by entry of the final MIPA
36
order. 1
In September 1985, the Commission issued an order delineating the productive limits of the Limes Field. The order declared that the Limes Field
consists of two separate, non-communicating sands and that the unit well
penetrates both sands and causes commingling. The Railroad Commission
granted a Rule 10137 exception, permitting downhole commingling of the
two sands, and established allocations for the Main Sand based on productive net acre-feet, and for the Stray Sand, based on surface acreage. Between
the time of the interim order in the MIPA proceeding and the final order in
the productive acreage proceeding, Pend Oreille made payments to the escrow account as required by the interim order. However, when the final
order in the productive acreage case was issued, Pend Oreille ceased making
the escrow payments.
In August 1987, the Commission entered a final MIPA order, pooling
productive acreage for the Bennett Unit and Forney tracts as to both the
Main and the Stray Sands. This order was made effective as of May 7, 1984,
the date of the MIPA interim order. Pend Oreille appealed to the district
court, which affirmed, and to the court of appeals, which affirmed in part
and reversed in part the trial court's judgment.13 8 Pend Oreille, Forney, and
the Commission appealed to the Texas supreme court.
On appeal, the supreme court first addressed whether Forney's offer to
voluntarily pool was fair and reasonable.' 39 The Commission has authority
136. Id. at 38-39.

137. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 16 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.10(b) (West Sept. 1, 1988). The exception was designed to prevent waste, promote conservation, and protect correlative rights.
817 S.W.2d at 45.
138. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 878
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 817 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. 1991).
139. Pend Oreille, 817 S.W.2d at 39-40. Prior to discussing the fairness and reasonableness
of Forney's offer, the supreme court clarified the appropriate appellate standard of review.
The court distinguished its decision in Carson v. Railroad Comm'n, 669 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.
1984), where the court held that the proper review of whether an offer is fair and reasonable is
a "jurisdictional review" rather than a substantial evidence review under the Administrative
Procedure & Texas Register Act § 19(e)(5), TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a

§ 191(e)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1992). A substantial evidence review requires reversal of agency
action if substantial rights of the appellant are prejudiced by administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions that are "not reasonably supported by substantial evidence in
view of the reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole." Id. The court explained
that in Carson, the court of appeals was held to have misinterpreted MIPA § 102.013(c), and
the court of appeals' application of such section was found by the Texas Supreme Court in
Carson to be erroneous as a matter of law. 817 S.W.2d at 41; 669 S.W.2d at 316. Thus, in that
case, the court was deciding the question of the Commission's jurisdiction, as a matter of law,
and was therefore not required to scrutinize the administrative record to determine whether
there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's conclusion. The Texas supreme
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to order pooling when the owners have not agreed to pool their interest' 4°
only after a fair and reasonable offer to pool has been made voluntarily. 14'
In this regard, the court determined that there was substantial evidence to
support the Commission's conclusion that Forney's offer of voluntary poolings was fair and reasonable.' 42 Forney's offer was detailed and contained
several alternatives. The court also noted that Pend Oreille did not respond
to Forney's offer by counteroffer, 43 and such lack of response frustrated the
goal of MIPA, that of encouraging voluntary pooling. 144 Although a
counteroffer is not required by MIPA, the court stated that the absence of a
counteroffer is a factor to be considered in deciding if an offer is fair and
45
reasonable.

The court then addressed the matter of the Commission's authority to
force pool, in a single MIPA proceeding, separate deposits of gas that are not
in actual communication, but in man-made communication through a
wellbore. Pend Oreille claimed that the Commission had no authority to
pool the Main Sand and the Stray Sand in one proceeding because MIPA
only authorizes the Commission to pool separate tracts of land that "are
embraced in a common reservoir of oil or gas"' 46 and contended that this
statutory authorization was intended to apply only to reservoirs in natural
communication. Forney and the Commission, on the other hand, asserted
that the MIPA authorized the Commission to pool separate lenticular reservoirs as a "common reservoir" where a common wellbore penetrated both
reservoirs and caused downhole commingling. The court of appeals had previously held that the Commission had exceeded its statutory authority in the
case in ordering pooling of the two reservoirs at issue because they were not
in natural communication. '47 The supreme court, however, reversed based
upon its analysis of the evolution of the Commission's authority to authorize
48

commingling. 1

As matters stood in 1977, the court noted that the Commission's Statewide Rule 10 totally prohibited downhole commingling. 49 Following decisions of the Texas Supreme Court in Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Graford Oil Corp.150 and Gage v. Railroad Commission of Texas,' 5 ' which
confirmed the Commission's lack of authority to combine separate reservoirs
into a single field for administrative purposes, the Commission began denying requests for commingling, which had the effect of preventing the recovcourt limited its statement about "jurisdictional review" in the Carson case to the narrow issue
presented in that case. 817 S.W.2d at 41-42.
140. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.011 (Vernon 1978).

141. Id. § 102.013.
142. Pend Oreille, 817 S.W.2d at 43.
143. Id.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.011 (Vernon 1978).
788 S.W.2d at 883.
817 S.W.2d at 44.
Id. at 45.
557 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. 1977).
582 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. 1979).
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ery of reserves in certain lenticular reservoirs. 152 In response, the Texas
legislature amended the Natural Resources Code to grant the Commission
authority to allow commingling in certain cases in order to prevent waste,
53
promote conservation, and protect correlative rights.1
After the passage of such legislation, the Commission amended Statewide
Rule 10 to permit exceptions from the rule and in the process further
amended Rule 10 to provide that commingled production "'shall be considered production from a common source of supply for purposes of proration
and allocation.' " 154 Subsequently, the Austin court of appeals held that the
latter amendment of Rule 10 by the Commission was invalid, reasoning that
while the legislature had given the Commission authority to grant exceptions
to Rule 10, it had not granted the Commission the authority to amend the
rule to allow commingled production to be considered production from a
common source of supply for proration purposes.1 5 In response to this
court decision, the legislature acted again and this time granted the Commission the authority to prorate the production from commingled reservoirs as
56
if they were from a common source of supply.'
The supreme court considered this legislative history to demonstrate an
intent by the legislature for the Commission to have broad discretion in regulating commingled oil and gas, and this discretion included the power to
order pooling of reservoirs commingled downhole. 157 According to the
court, the legislature's response to Gage and Mote demonstrates that the legislature resisted an interpretation of the term "common reservoir" that
158
would have limited the Commission's regulatory authority in this area.
Of further significance to the supreme court were certain provisions of the
16
Natural Resources Code. 159 The court interpreted sections 86.081(b), 0
85.046(b), and 86.012(b)1 6 1to evidence the legislature's intent to grant broad
152. 817 S.W.2d at 45.
153. Id.; see Act of May 29, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 300, §§ 1, 2, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws
673, 673-75 (codified at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 85.046, 86.012).
154. 817 S.W.2d at 45 (quoting Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 4 Tex. Reg. 3082 (1979) (codified at 16
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.10(b), (c) (West Sept. 1, 1988))).
155. See Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Mote Resources, 645 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
156. 817 S.W.2d at 46. See Act of June 16, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 688, §§ 1-3, 1981,
Tex. Gen. Laws 2578, 2578-80 (codified at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 85.053, 85.055,
86.081 (Vernon Supp. 1992)).
157. 817 S.W.2d at 46.

158. Id.
159. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 86.081(b), 85.046(b), 86.012(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
160. Section 86.081(b) provides in part:
When... the Commission has permitted production by commingling oil or gas
or oil and gas from multiple stratigraphic or lenticular accumulations of oil or
gas or oil and gas, the commission may prorate, allocate, and regulate the production of such commingled, separate multiple stratigraphic or lenticular accumulations of oil or gas or oil and gas as if they were a single common reservoir
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 86.081(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
161. Sections 85.046(b) and 86.012(b) provide:
Notwithstanding the provisions contained in this section or elsewhere in this
code or in other statutes or laws, the commission may permit production by
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authority to the Commission over gas production from commingled reservoirs. 162 Reasoning that the stated objectives of these sections are virtually

identical to the stated purpose of the MIPA, the court concluded that the
Commission, in exercising its pooling authority, may permit commingling of
separate gas reservoirs not in natural communication in order to achieve the
stated statutory objectives. 163 The court held that the Commission's application of the term "common reservoir" to include the Main Sand and the
Stray Sand was reasonable. 6
Finally, the court addressed the validity of the Commission's action in
making the MIPA order retroactive and determined that Pend Oreille was
estopped from complaining about the retroactive effective date of the final
MIPA order. 165 The court found that the parties were on notice that the
Commission was contemplating the entry of a pooling order and that the
date of the final order would be made effective as of the date of the interim
order. 166 Because Pend Oreille initially agreed to this, and because Pend
Oreille did not seek a modification of the interim order, the court held that
Pend Oreille was precluded from complaining on appeal about the effective
date. 167
B.

Compliance with Lease Provisions

Pampell Interests, Inc. v. Wolle1 68 illustrates the requirement for valid
pooling that the lessee strictly comply with the lease's pooling provisions. In
1983, Wayne Wolle and others granted an oil, gas, and mineral lease to
Pampell Interests, Inc. The lease contained a pooling provision which authorized Pampell to pool the leased premises with other land. The lease
further provided that operations on acreage pooled with the Wolle tract
would maintain the Pampell lease. On the last day of the primary term of
the lease, Zeal Energy Corporation 169 filed a unit designation which purported to pool a portion of the Wolle tract into a 160 acre unit. At that time,
Zeal was engaged in drilling operations on other acreage covered by the unit
designation. Pampell claimed that its lease covering the Wolle tract was still
in force and effect as a result of operations by Zeal on the pooled acreage.
The Wolles, on the other hand, contended that the lease had expired, and
they soon granted a lease to a third party, U.S. Companies, Inc.
commingling oil or gas or oil and gas from multiple stratigraphic or lenticular
accumulations of oil or gas or oil and gas where the commission, after notice
and hearing, has found that producing oil or gas and oil and gas in a commingled state will prevent waste, promote conservation, or protect correlative rights.
TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 85.046(b), 86.012(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).

162. 817 S.W.2d at 46.
163. Id. at 46-47.
164. Id. at 47.
165. Id. at 48.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 49.
168. 797 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
169. Alfred E. Pampell is the president and sole shareholder of both Pampell Interests, Inc.
and Zeal Energy Corporation. Id. at 393.
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The Wolles and U.S. Companies brought suit against Pampell and Zeal
seeking a declaration that the Pampell lease had expired at the end of its
primary term and that the unit designation was void as to the Wolle tract.
The Wolles also sought damages. The trial court granted the plaintiffs the
declaratory relief they sought and awarded them approximately $75,000 actual and punitive damages for slander of title. 170 Zeal and Pampell
appealed.
Pampell claimed that the unit designation was valid because Zeal was acting as its agent when it filed the document. The appellate court rejected this
contention. 17 1 The court noted that the parties to an oil, gas, and mineral
lease, who attempt to utilize a pooling provision therein, must strictly comply with the requirements of such provision. 172 The particular pooling provision at issue required the "lessee" to execute and record the unit
designation. 173 Accordingly, Pampell was the party required to sign and file
the document, not Zeal. 174 Therefore, Pampell failed to strictly comply with
the lease provision. 17 5 As to the issue of agency, the court noted that Zeal
did not specify in the unit designation that it was acting as agent for
Pampell. 17 6 To the contrary, Zeal purported to be the owner of the Pampell
lease. 177 The appellate court therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment
178
voiding the lease and the unit designation with regard to the lease.
The court of appeals, however, reversed the trial court's award of damages, noting that a plaintiff who sues for slander of title must plead and
prove the loss of a specific sale. 17 9 The plaintiffs in the case at hand alleged a
cloud on their title and general damages. Because the plaintiffs failed to
allege the loss of a specific sale, the appellate court reversed the damage
award and rendered judgment that the Wolles take nothing on their claim
0
for slander of title. 18
IV.

ISSUES INVOLVING AGENCY REGULATION

In Lone StarSalt Water DisposalCo. v. Railroad Commission 181 the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment upholding a 1979 Railroad
Commission order requiring Lone Star to clean, back-fill, and compact three
pits filled with oil and saltwater residue, and to dispose of the oil and residue. 182 The pits, which had been part of an oil skimming plant established
in the 1920s in the Spindletop field, were part of an extensive network of
170. Id.
171. Id. at 394.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 396.
800 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
Id. at 931.
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canals through which saltwater and waste oil was channeled to the plant.
After recoverable oil was skimmed from the surface, the remaining saltwater
and oil mixture was pumped into the three disposal pits. While in these pits,
the oil and saltwater would separate and the saltwater would be pumped out
of the pits for disposal into a local river. The oil residue, or sludge, that
remained in the pits was ignited, and most, but not all of it, burned away.
Over the years, a substantial amount of sludge accumulated in the pits.
These pits were originally owned and operated by Yount-Lee Oil Company,
which merged into Stanolind Oil Company (now Amoco) in 1935. Stanolind
operated the skimming facility from 1935 until 1952, when it conveyed the
system to Lone Star. Lone Star operated the skimming plant until 1975.
In 1978, the Commission issued a notice to Lone Star and Amoco of a
hearing to consider responsibility for proper disposal of the sludge 83 in the
three pits and for backfilling and compacting the pits.'

84

The Commission

ultimately ordered Lone Star to dispose of the sludge and to fill the pits.
Lone Star appealed, claiming that Amoco should be ordered to share the
responsibility and expense of the clean-up work.
On appeal, Lone Star claimed that the Commission's order was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious. With regard to the matter of substantial evidence, Lone Star asserted that the basic
facts found by the Commission were not used to support its determination
that Lone Star should be wholly responsible for the clean-up operations because it exercised control over the skimming system and the pits for twentythree years, from 1952 to 1975. Lone Star argued that because the Commission found that Amoco had also stored sludge in the pits, the Commission
was compelled to order Amoco to bear partial responsibility for the cleanup. The court of appeals, however, disagreed, holding that reasonable minds
could have reached the same conclusion that the Commission reached, and
that there was no authority requiring the Commission to order both parties
to clean the pits and backfill them.' 85
As to Lone Star's claim that the Commission's order was arbitrary and
capricious, Lone Star contended that the Commission abused its discretion
by considering irrelevant factors. According to Lone Star, the only relevant
factor was whether a party stored petroleum by-products in an open pit, and
the selection of only one party (Lone-Star) who partially contributed to an
indivisible condition (the pits) to bear total responsibility for that condition
was inherently arbitrary. The appellate court rejected this claim, analogiz183. Statewide Rule 21(C) provides: "No person engaged in the production, transportation, storage, handling, refining, reclaiming, processing, treating, or marketing of crude petroleum oil or the products or lay products thereof shall store, either permanently or temporarily,
crude petroleum oil or the products and by products thereof in open pits or earthen storage."
Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.21(c) (West 1988).
184. Statewide Rule 8(C)(4), as it existed at the time of the Commission's order, provided:
"In any instance where a salt water disposal pit is presently in use and is abandoned, due to
cessation of flow of salt water thereto, whether voluntary or mandatory, such pit shall be
backfilled and compacted." Texas R.R. Comm'n. Rule 8(C)(4) (since revised as 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8 (West 1988)).

185. 800 S.W.2d at 929.
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ing this case to tort law situations in which an injured plaintiff who suffered
an indivisible harm caused by two or more tortfeasors may proceed against
only one of them for total relief. 186 Accordingly, the court of appeals af187
firmed the trial court's judgment which upheld the Commission's order.
The court of appeals in Lone Star Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission 188 reversed the judgment of the trial court, and invalidated Rules 30189 and 34190

of the Texas Railroad Commission, which regulate the purchase of gas by
pipeline affiliates known as "special marketing programs" (SMPs) 191 on the
basis that the Rules attempt to regulate a subject which has been preempted
by federal law. In response to the creation of SMPs, the Commission
that makes its "ratapromulgated rules under which it established a scheme 192
ble take" and proration rules applicable to the SMPs.
The evidence presented in this case established that Lone Star is an intrastate and interstate pipeline company wholly owned by Enserch Corporation
and that Enserch Gas Company (EGC) is an affiliated gas marketing company that purchases gas from the spot market and delivers that gas to customers by utilizing Lone Star's pipeline system. The evidence further
established that EGC often purchases gas from operators who have contracts with Lone Star and in such situations Lone Star conditions the release
of gas from its contracts for sale to EGC upon an agreement from the operator that gas sold to EGC will be credited to Lone Star's take obligation
under the contract from which the gas is being released.
Rules 30 and 34 created obvious complications for the release procedures
being followed by Lone Star and EGC, and, as a result, Lone Star and EGC
filed suit seeking a declaration that Rules 30 and 34 were invalid as applied
186. Id. at 930.
187. Id 't 931.
188. 798 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ granted).

189. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.30 (West 1988).
190. Id. § 3.34.
191. Special marketing programs are affiliates of gas pipeline companies created primarily
for the purpose of purchasing gas that has been released from long-term gas purchase contracts
under which the pipeline is committed to buy the gas. 798 S.W.2d at 891.
192. One of the rules promulgated by the Commission in this respect is Rule 30(a)(1)
which provides in relevant part that "[a] first purchaser and any affiliate of the purchaser that
transports any natural gas it purchases from a well by use of the same pipeline system used by
the first purchaser of which it is an affiliate shall be treated as a single first purchaser for
purposes of ratability requirements."
Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.30(a)(b) (West 1988). An affiliate is defined as a "person or entity that owns, is owned by,
or is under common ownership with another person or entity to the extent of 50% or more or
that otherwise controls or is controlled by another person or entity." Id. § 3.30(a)(5). An
exception from the scope of Rule 30 is created for entities which qualify as SMPs under Rule
34(h). Rule 34(h) establishes a regulatory scheme by which a pipeline may qualify an affiliate
as an SMP and the SMP will then be considered a separate first purchaser not subject to the
aggregation requirements of Rule 30. Id. § 3.34(h). Rule 34, however, imposes stringent requirements upon those seeking to qualify as an SMP including the following: (i) every offer of
purchase made by the SMP must be made to all operators on the affiliate pipeline's system
from whom the pipeline is buying gas; (ii) the SMP and its affiliated pipeline are prohibited
from seeking significant take-or-pay price concessions in conjunction with the release of gas by
the pipeline and its subsequent purchase by the SMP; and (iii) the SMP and its affiliate pipeline are prohibited from purchasing low-cost, low-priority gas until all high-cost, high-priority
gas on the affiliate pipelines system is purchased. Id.
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to Lone Star's intrastate pipeline system. Lone Star and EGC advanced several arguments to support the claim that the rules are invalid. The court of
appeals first addressed the contention of Lone Star and EGC that Rules 30
and 34 exceed the Commission's statutory rule-making authority. In this
regard, the court noted that the Commission's statutory authority is derived
from a broad legislative delegation of authority codified in the Texas Natural
Resources Code 193 which authorizes the Commission in administering the
provisions of the Code to adopt any rule or order in the manner provided by
law that it finds necessary to effectuate the provisions and purposes of the
Code. 194 Specifically, the court observed that the Commission has the authority and the duty to promulgate rules for the prevention of waste and
conservation of gas.1 95 The court found that the Commission had promulgated Rules 30 and 34 as part of an effort to protect priority schemes created
by the Commission concerning nominations, purchases, and the production
of gas following the advent of SMPs, and that the priority schemes at issue
assured that casinghead gas, oil, and gas being produced from special allowable wells would continue to be produced. 196 On this basis, the court concluded that Rules 30 and 34 enhanced the Commission's ability to regulate
waste, promote conservation, protect correlative rights, and prevent discrimination, all of which provided ample authority for the Commission to pro197
mulgate those rules.
The court next addressed the claim of Lone Star and EGC that Rules 30
and 34 are inconsistent with the provisions of the statutes that create the
Commission's rule-making authority. The court rejected this contention as
well, holding that Rules 30 and 34 are consistent with the underlying statutes and their goals of preventing waste, protecting correlative rights, and
preventing discrimination. 98 In this connection, the court stated that the
Commission had demonstrated that in the absence of Rules 30 and 34 the
protective scheme created by the Commission to effectuate those goals
99
would be circumvented.
The court next considered the contention of Lone Star and EGC that the
statutes on which the Commission relied in promulgating Rules 30 and 34
do not contain standards supporting the Commission's exercise of its rulemaking authority in this instance. Specifically, Lone Star and EGC complained that the statutes involved do not define the term "affiliate," and do
not contain authorization for aggregating affiliates and treating them as a
single first purchaser and do not define the concept of discrimination to encompass the content of contractual negotiations. The court of appeals summarily rejected these arguments stating that the legislature's failure to
address specific unforeseen circumstances in statutes that delegate authority
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

798 S.W.2d at 893.
Id. (citing TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 893-94.
Id.
Id.

§

86.041 (Vernon 1978)).
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to the Commission does not render those statues invalid for "want of standards." 2°° The court further noted that to require that legislation address
each possible exercise of Commission power would defeat the purpose of
delegating legislative authority to the Commission for rule-making purposes. 20 1 The court concluded that the standards necessary to support the
action of the Commission and promulgating Rules 30 and 34 are found in
those statutes that direct the Commission to prevent waste, promote conser20 2
vation, and protect correlative rights.
Finally, the court addressed whether Rules 30 and 34 attempted to regulate an area which was preempted by federal statute. In this regard, Lone
Star and EGC contended that the rules were preempted by the Natural Gas
Act (NGA) 20 3 and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA). 2°4 The
NGA established a price control system to regulate the transportation and
sale of gas in interstate commerce. 20 5 The NGPA was enacted after the energy shortages of the 1970s and was generally intended to permit the phased
deregulation of natural gas price controls. 2°6 In the process of doing this,
however, the NGPA actually expanded federal control of the gas industry in
many respects by delegating regulatory authority over intrastate transactions
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission while preserving the NGA
pricing control of gas flowing in interstate commerce. 20 7 In analyzing the
preemption issue, the court of appeals noted that the United States Supreme
Court specifically held that under the NGA state regulation of gas purchasers is completely preempted and any attempt by a state to regulate gas purchasers is void. 20 8 The court also noted that the United States Supreme
Court has consistently held that the NGPA preempts state attempts to regulate gas prices by regulating natural gas purchasers. 2°9
Recognizing that states may regulate production in a manner that incidentally affects purchasers' costs, the court of appeals concluded that under the
decision in TranscontinentalGas Pipeline Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Board of
Mississippi210 the NGPA preempts all state regulations that have an impact
on matters within federal control and that are not an incident of efforts to
achieve a "proper state purpose." 2 11 To determine whether a particular
state regulation is intruding upon federally preempted ground, the court
stated that the Transco decision requires a determination of three factors:
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 717-717W (West 1976 & Supp. 1990).
204. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301-3432 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
205. 798 S.W.2d at 895.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 895-96.
208. Id. at 896 (citing Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 489
U.S. 493 (1989)).
209. Id. (citing Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd. of Miss., 474
U.S. 409 (1986); Northwest Pipeline, 489 U.S. 493 (1989); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.,
485 U.S. 293 (1988)).
210. 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
211. 798 S.W.2d at 896 (quoting Northwest Pipeline, 189 S.Ct. at 1277).

1992

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

"(1) whether the regulation comes within the limits of the comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme; (2) whether the state regulation conflicts with the
federal interest, expressed by [the NGA and the NGPA], in protecting gas
consumers by ensuring low gas prices; and (3) whether the regulation is di' 21 2
rected at purchasers."
Applying these standards to the case at hand, the court determined that
Rules 30 and 34 violated these standards. 21 3 The court determined that the
Rules, as applied in this case, impermissibly regulated federally regulated
purchasers of gas. 214 Lone Star is a federally regulated purchaser of gas,
because it is a pipeline that sells to both interstate pipelines and to local
distribution companies served by interstate pipelines. 21 5 EGC, although not
directly regulated by federal legislation, nevertheless is also a federally regulated purchaser of gas because it purchases gas in a market that is partially
regulated. 21 6 As a result, the court concluded that Rules 30 and 34 encroached upon the federally preempted field established by the NGA and the
NGPA. 21 7 Further, the court held that although Rules 30 and 34 affect
production and therefore appear to fall within the permissible state regulation, 218 in reality the Rules also create higher gas prices on the spot markets
in which SMPs operate. 21 9 Therefore the Rules constitute an exercise of
state regulatory authority for an improper purpose in that they regulate gas
pricing that falls within the federal regulatory scheme. 220
Finally, the court analyzed the effect of Rules 30 and 34 upon gas supply
and prices. Because Rule 30 aggregates an SMP and its affiliated pipeline
into a single first purchaser, if the SMP transports any gas it purchases on
the affiliate's pipeline, the court concluded that the consequence for EGC is
that its ability to buy low-cost spot market gas for which it has willing buyers is limited to the affiliated pipeline's ability to buy high-cost gas for which
no market exists. 22 ' The only alternative is for EGC to qualify under Rule
34, in which case (i) every offer to purchase gas made by EGC must be
made to all operators on the affiliated pipeline's system from which the pipeline has been buying gas; (ii) the SMP and its pipeline affiliate are both prohibited from seeking significant take-or-pay price concessions; and (iii) the
SMP and its pipeline affiliate are prohibited from buying low-cost, low-priority gas until all high-cost, high-priority gas on the system is purchased. 222
The court concluded that although these rules do not specifically restrict the
SMP's ability to purchase gas, they effectively constitute a prohibition
against a significant amount of otherwise permissible natural gas purchases
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. (citing Transco, 474 U.S. at 420).
Id. at 897.
Id.
Id.at 896.
Id.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 896.
Id.at 896-97.
Id.at 897.
Id.
Id.
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and this has a substantial affect upon gas supply and gas pricing. 22 3 On this
basis the court concluded that Rules 30 and 34 fall within the limits of the
comprehensive federal scheme which regulates the price of natural gas, conflict with the federal interest in maintaining low gas prices, and seeks to
regulate gas purchasers already regulated by federal statute. 224 As a result,
the court concluded that Rules 30 and 34 impermissibly intruded upon sub225
ject areas preempted by federal statutes.
In Texaco Producing,Inc. v. Fortson Oil Co. 226 the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment affirming the Railroad Commission's denial
of Texaco's conditional application for reinstatement of unused allowables 227 on the ground that the Commission's actions were not supported by
substantial evidence and were arbitrary and capricious. 2 2 8 In this case, Texaco and Fortson were the only producers in the two reservoirs involved.
Texaco and Fortson sold their gas to the same purchaser, and the gas was
transported by the same pipeline. In 1987 and 1988, Fortson's and Texaco's
actual production from the reservoirs was significantly lower than their per
well allowables because their purchaser took less gas than Texaco and Fortson could have produced. Texaco's and Fortson's unused allowables were
automatically canceled pursuant to the Commission's rules. In 1989, when
demand for gas increased, Fortson applied to the Commission for reinstatement of its canceled allowables. Texaco filed a conditional application for
reinstatement of its canceled allowables if Fortson's application was granted.
The Commission granted Fortson's application, and denied Texaco's. Texaco appealed.
It was undisputed that reinstatement of Fortson's canceled allowables
would result in drainage that Texaco would be unable to offset. However,
the Commission and Fortson argued that the Commission was justified in
treating Fortson and Texaco differently for several reasons. First, Fortson
and the Commission contended that the Commission was absolutely precluded from reinstating Texaco's allowables because Texaco's canceled allowables were for "limited" wells, 2 29 whereas Fortson's reinstated allowables
were for "prorated" wells. 230 Because Statewide Rule 31(g)(1)231 expressly
provides that limited wells are not allowed to accumulate underproduction,
Fortson and the Commission claimed that this rule prevented reinstatement
of Texaco's canceled allowables. The court of appeals rejected this contention, noting that Texaco's application for reinstatement was brought under
223. Id.
224. Id. at 898.
225. Id.

226. 798 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
227. "An 'allowable' is the amount of gas a reservoir or a well is permitted to produce
under the commission's proration orders." Id. at 623.
228. Id. at 626.
229. Limited wells are not capable of producing to the full extent of their prorated allowables, so they are assigned limited allowables based on their limited production capability.
Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.31(0(1) (West Supp. 1990).
230. Prorated wells are those that are capable of full production, and they are assigned a
pro rata share of the reservoir's total allowable. Id. § 3.31(0(4).
231. Id. § 3.31(g)(1).
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Rule 34(k), 232 which expressly provides for an exception to Rule 31 to protect correlative rights and to prevent undue hardship. According to the
court of appeals, the distinction between prorated and limited wells is a distinction without a difference when the Commission is proceeding to protect
correlative rights. 233 Accordingly, the court held that the distinction between limited wells and prorated wells would not support the Commission's
234
different treatment of Fortson and Texaco.
Second, Fortson claimed that its drainage of Texaco would not injure Texaco's correlative rights because Texaco had already produced more than its
share of reserves from the field involved. Originally, allowables for the field
at issue had been assigned on the basis of surface acreage. Later, the Commission changed the field allowable formula to an acre-feet basis. As a result
of this change, Fortson's share of production was increased. Fortson contended that, had the acre-feet formula been applicable as of the date of first
production from the field, Fortson would have been entitled to a produce
greater share of the field's reserves, and under this reasoning, Texaco had
already overproduced its fair share of the reservoir. The court, however,
also rejected this claim, reasoning that Texaco's advantage did not result
from illegal activity; rather, Texaco's "overproduction" had occurred as the
result of compliance with the Commission's previous field allowable orders. 235 The court also rejected Fortson's argument because the Commission's orders may not be made to operate retroactively, and accepting
Fortson's position necessarily would cause the Commission to effectively apply its field allowable order retroactively to correct past infringements of
236
correlative rights.
Third, Fortson and the Commission asserted that Texaco failed to meet its
burden of showing hardship because Texaco's application was purely speculative since Texaco would suffer hardship only if Fortson produced from the
field at the level of its reinstated allowables. The court disagreed with this
contention, holding that the contingent nature of Texaco's application did
not make it impossible for the Commission to decide the issue. 237 The court
of appeals accordingly reversed the district court's judgment affirming the
Commission, and remanded the case to the Commission for further
238
proceedings.
V.

ISSUES INVOLVING JOINT OPERATIONS

Pelto Oil Co. v. CSX Oil & Gas Corp.239 involved claims between two
working interest owners over proceeds from the sale of gas that was misallocated by the operator. Pelto and CSX are working interest co-owners, with
232. Id. § 3.34(k) (West 1988).
233. 798 S.W.2d at 624.
234. Id. at 625.

235. Id.

236. Id.
237. Id.at 626.

238. Id.
239. 804 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
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others, in offshore oil and gas leases covered by the Ship Shoal Block 271
Unit. The operator of the unit is CNG Producing Company. The owners
are parties to a unit operating agreement and a gas balancing agreement.
For a fourteen month period, Pelto's share of the gas produced from the unit
was sold to Texas Gas, but was mistakenly allocated by CNG to CSX.
Texas Gas, therefore, paid CSX for the gas that should have been allocated
to Pelto.
Pelto brought suit against CSX seeking to recover the proceeds that were
paid to CSX by Texas Gas under the erroneous allocation. Pelto claimed
that CSX breached the unit operating agreement. 24 0 Pelto asserted that, by
retaining the proceeds for gas that should have been allocated to Pelto, CSX
wrongfully marketed Pelto's interest in production. CSX defended the ac,
tion on the grounds that the gas balancing agreement provided for in-kind
balancing as the exclusive remedy in situations of overproduction and underproduction. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court
granted CSX's motion, and denied Pelto's. 241 Pelto appealed.
In response to CSX's claim that the gas balancing agreement provided for
the exclusive remedy of in-kind balancing, Pelto contended that the gas balancing agreement did not apply to all gas imbalances, and, specifically, did
not apply to imbalances due to accounting errors. The appellate court
agreed. The court first noted that the gas balancing agreement did not contain any express statement that it was the sole and exclusive remedy in the
event gas production accounts became imbalanced. 242 Turning to the preamble of the gas balancing agreement, the court observed that, by its express
language, the gas balancing agreement was intended to apply to those situations when one or more of the parties "may be unable to take or market its
interest in the gas production from time to time."'243 In the case at hand, the
court found that Pelto was able to take its share of gas, and Pelto had marketed its share to Texas Gas. 244 The appellate court held that the term "may
be unable to take or market" did not include situations, like the one at hand,
where there was a failure to credit a working interest owner for its share of
production, which had actually been taken and marketed, but for which the
working interest owner was not credited, due to the operator's accounting
error. 245 Accordingly, the court determined'that the gas balancing agree246
ment did not apply to the matter at issue.
The court next considered whether CSX breached the marketing provi240. The agreement provided, in part:
"[E]ach party shall have the sole and exclusive right to direct and effect the sale
and disposition of its respective interest in such production. Under no circumstances shall any party hereto have the right to market any other party's interest
in production ....
"
Id. at 584 (emphasis omitted).
241. Id. at 586.
242. Id. at 586-87.
243. Id. at 587.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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sion of the operating agreement. CSX claimed that, if there was any breach
of the operating agreement, then it was a breach by CNG, the unit operator.
Additionally, CSX asserted that it only marketed its own share of production when Pelto's agent, CNG, failed to deliver Pelto's share of production,
and that Pelto was bound by the acts of its agent. The court rejected this
argument, noting that CNG was also the agent of CSX, who was likewise
bound by CNG's acts and further noting that all working interest owners
received copies of the monthly allocation reports, and all were equally
charged with knowledge of allocation errors. 247 On these facts, the court
held that CSX breached the unit operating agreement when it failed to deliver to Pelto the proceeds received by CSX for sales of gas that should have
been allocated to Pelto, 248 and reversed the trial court's summary
249
judgment.
In Texstar North America, Inc. v. Ladd Petroleum Corp.250 the court of
appeals held that the refusal of a non-operator to consent to fracture stimulate a well did not constitute a breach of the applicable joint operating agreement, even though the non-consenting party's activities on adjacent acreage
were causing the jointly-owned well to be drained of hydrocarbons. In this
case, Ladd owned leases covering an undivided 8.15625% interest in minerals in certain land known as the Zalman Tract. Texstar had leases covering
virtually all of the remaining interest in such tract. Ladd also had the majority interest in other leases on lands adjoining the Zalman Tract, and Ladd
had established production on these leases. In early 1987, Texstar drilled
and completed a producing well on the Zalman Tract as an offset to Ladd's
wells. The well, called the Zalman No. 1, was drilled without the consent of,
or participation by, Ladd. Ladd, as a non-consenting cotenant, was entitled
to share in the revenue of the Zalman No. 1 after payout. Following payout,
Texstar and Ladd entered into a joint operating agreement with regard to
the Zalman Tract, with Texstar as the operator.
Approximately two years later, Texstar submitted to Ladd a proposal to
fracture stimulate the Zalman No. 1 to enhance the well's productive capacity. At the time of the proposal, the Zalman No. 1 was producing in paying
quantities. However, Texstar believed that the existing production rate was
insufficient to prevent drainage of the Zalman Tract by Ladd's other wells.
Ladd did not consent to the fracture procedure. Texstar brought suit against
Ladd, alleging that Ladd's refusal to consent to fracture stimulate the
Zalman No. 1 constituted breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and
breach of an implied duty of mutual cooperation arising out of the joint
operating agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Ladd
as to all of Texstar's claims. 25' On appeal, Texstar claimed that the trial
court erred in doing so because the joint operating agreement did not permit
Ladd to refuse consent in this situation.
247. Id.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
Id. at 588.
809 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
Id. at 674.
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The appellate court examined the joint operating agreement, and found
254
that it was unambiguous. 252 It noted that articles VI.B. 1253 and VII.D.2
expressly provided terms and conditions that had to be satisfied before a well
could be reworked. Because fracture stimulation is considered to be a "rework" procedure, and because Texstar's proposed stimulation involved a
well that was then producing in paying quantities, the court held that Article
VII.D.2 controlled. 255 Under those circumstances, Texstar could not proceed with fracture stimulation without Ladd's consent. Texstar conceded
that the agreement did not expressly impose any restrictions on Ladd's right
to refuse consent. However, Texstar argued that Ladd, in this situation,
could not properly withhold consent without breaching certain duties allegedly owed to Texstar.
With regard to the alleged duty of good faith and fair dealing, Texstar
claimed that the relationship between working interest owners is fiduciary in
character, and that such persons owed each other the duty of utmost good
faith and fair dealing. The court rejected this claim, noting that there can be
no implied covenant as to a matter specifically covered by the written terms
of the contract. 256 Because the joint operating agreement specifically governed the terms and conditions for reworking the operations, the court held
that Texstar's reliance upon an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
was without merit. 257 As to the alleged duty of mutual cooperation, the
court held that because Articles VI.B.1 and VII.D.2 expressly and unambiguously set out the terms under which a party to the joint operating agreement at issue could withhold consent, there could be no implied covenant to
the contrary. 2 58 Accordingly, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's
259
summary judgment favorable to Ladd on Texstar's claims.
In REO Industries v. NaturalGas Pipeline Co. 260 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's summary judgment that a non252. Id. at 677.
253. Article VI.B.1 provided in part:
Should any party herein desire to drill any well on the Contract Area, or to
rework, deepen or plug back a dry hole not then producing in paying quantities,
the party desiring to drill, rework, deepen or plug back such a well shall give the
other parties written notice of the proposed operation, specifying the work to be
performed, the location, proposed depth, objective formation and estimated cost
of the operation.
Id. at 675.
254. Article VII.D.2 stated, in part:
Without the consent of all parties, no well shall be reworked or plugged back,
except a well reworked or plugged back pursuant to the provisions of Article
VI.B.2 of this agreement. Consent to the reworking or plugging back of a well
shall include all necessary expenditures in conducting such operations and completing and equipping of such well, including necessary tankage and/or surface
facilities.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 677.
See id. at 678 (citing Exxon v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 678 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1984)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 679.
932 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1991).
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operator did not breach the terms of a joint operating agreement when it
opposed the operator's application for an exception to the applicable spacing
rules necessary for the continued operation of a gas well covered by the operating agreement. 261 REO owned the oil rights, and Natural Gas Pipeline
Company (NGPL) owned the gas rights in the same 640 acre tract in the
Texas Panhandle. In 1985, REO drilled a well seeking oil, but instead found
gas. A 1933 joint operating agreement between the predecessors in interest
of REO and NGPL specified that under those circumstances the gas operator would have the right, but not the obligation, to purchase the well. If the
gas operator declined to purchase the well, the operating agreement provided that the oil operator would own the well and have the right to operate
it for his own use and benefit.
REO offered the gas well to NGPL, but NGPL declined to purchase the
well. At that time, NGPL had an existing well on the tract that was produc262
ing gas, and according to the Texas Railroad Commission's density rule
and the applicable field rules, 263 only one gas well was permitted on the
tract. Thus, the well was useless to NGPL and to REO unless NGPL
plugged its pre-existing well or unless the Railroad Commission granted an
exception to its density rule. REO initially applied to the Railroad Commission for such an exception. NGPL opposed the application. REO withdrew
its application for exception, and brought suit against NGPL seeking damages for NGPL's alleged breach of the operating agreement by interfering
with REO's operations. REO asserted that the operating agreement 264 obligated NGPL to refrain from opposing REO's application for density exception, to buy REO's well, or to plug its own well, and consequently forfeit all
its rights under its gas lease, in order to permit REO to operate the new gas
well.
NGPL and REO filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial
court granted NGPL's motion, and dismissed REO's claim, determining
that: (1) there had been no breach of the operating agreement, because the
agreement did not require NGPL to refrain from opposing REO's applications of the Commission, and did not impose an obligation on NGPL to
either purchase REO's well or to abandon its leasehold rights by plugging its
own well; (2) REO's claims were not ripe because REO had shown no injuries; and (3) even if REO had been injured, NGPL's conduct was not the
261. Id. at 455-56.
262. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.38 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990-91).

263. Railroad Comm'n of Tex., Oil & Gas Div., Docket No. 108, Special Order No. 1013,196, Adopting and Promulgating Field Rules to Apply to All Gas Wells Located in the
West Sweet and West Sour Areas of the Panhandle Field, Rule 3(a), September 24, 1948;
Docket No. 10-87,017, Amended Final Order Adopting and Clarifying Rules and Regulations,
March 20, 1989.
264. In support of its position, REO relied upon Paragraph II of the operating agreement,
which provides: "[I]t is further understood that each party shall so conduct its operations and
so locate its improvements and equipment on said premises as to interfere as little as possible
with operations of the other." 932 F.2d at 452 (emphasis omitted). REO also relied upon
Paragraph XV of the operating agreement, which states: "Each party agrees ... to comply

with all state and federal laws and to protect any interest of the other party in such leases
against liens or encumbrances caused by its acts or omissions." Id. (emphasis omitted).
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cause of any such damages. 265 REO appealed.
REO argued on appeal that when NGPL elected not to purchase the well,
the provisions of the operating agreement effectively transferred to REO title
to all the gas that the well could produce. As a consequence, REO contended that NGPL forfeited all its rights to the gas in place under the tract.
According to REO, NGPL breached the operating agreement when it interfered with REO's efforts to produce the gas by opposing REO's application
for a exception to Rule 38 and by failing to plug its own well.
The Fifth Circuit rejected REO's argument. The court held that NGPL
had not breached the operating agreement because its provisions specifically
stated that it is subject to state statutes and regulations. 266 Noting that the

Railroad Commission requires notice to interested parties and permits such
parties to appear at hearings regarding density exceptions, 267 the court concluded that NGPL, in opposing REO's density exception application, was
merely exercising the rights granted to it by the Railroad Commission. 26s
The Fifth Circuit similarly rejected REO's contention that the operating
agreement required NGPL to plug its well, holding that paragraphs II and
XV could not reasonably be construed to require such results, and that there
was nothing in the operating agreement that warranted the implication of
26 9
such requirements.
Next, the court considered REO's complaint regarding the district court's
holding that REO's claim was not ripe because REO had not suffered any
damages. The trial court reasoned that, without an exception to the density
rule, REO's well had no economic value.270 The Fifth Circuit agreed with
the trial court's analysis that the damages sought by REO were for loss of
the economic value of the well, being lost potential profits. 27 1 The court
reasoned that REO never had any exploitable economic interest in the potential production of the new gas well, because without a density exception,
it could not produce a single molecule of gas. 272 Because REO could not
legally produce gas, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court prop273
erly held that REO had not suffered any legally cognizable injury.

Finally, the appellate court considered REO's complaint regarding the
district court's holding that, even if NGPL's actions breached the contract
and even if REO suffered damages, REO's damages were not causally related to the breach. The Fifth Circuit agreed that there was no clear causal
link between NGPL's actions and any injury on the part of REO, because
REO had voluntarily withdrawn its application for density exception, and it
was the lack of exception relief that brought about the worthlessness of
265. Id. at 452.
266. Id. at 455.
267. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.38(a)(4), 3.38(0, 1.24 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1990-91).
268. 932 F.2d at 455.

269. Id. at 455-56.
270. Id. at 457.
271. Id.
272. Id.

273. Id.
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REO's gas well. 27 4 The court therefore affirmed the trial court's summary
27 5
judgment.
VI.

MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

NL Industries, Inc. v. GHR Energy Corp.276 arose out of a workover
agreement between the parties that was entered into in connection with
277
GHR's reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
GHR owned 10 wells in southwest Texas that it desired to have fractured for
the purpose of enhancing gas production. NL is an international corporation that provides such services, and the bankruptcy court authorized GHR
to enter into a workover agreement with NL in order to generate more income for the bankrupt estate. The agreement provided that NL would service the wells using whatever method GHR stipulated. The agreement also
provided that an engineering firm, S.A. Holditch & Associates, Inc., would
review GHR's designs. NL was required to finance the workovers, but, as
compensation for the services, GHR assigned NL a production payment
equal to 75% of the net revenue from the sale of that portion of the gas
production attributable to the production enhancement procedures. GHR
assured NL that the revenues produced by the workovers would compensate
NL within six months for its expenses. As it turned out, however, the
workovers cost more than $14 million, and produced only $5.4 million in
additional revenue.
NL sued GHR under a variety of causes of action, including breach of
contract, negligence, fraud and mutual mistake, seeking actual and punitive
damages. NL's underlying claim was that GHR used a much riskier and
more expensive method to rework the wells than the method NL thought it
would use. NL also sued Holditch for damages under a negligence theory,
on the claim that the firm had not used reasonable care in reviewing GHR's
workover proposals. GHR moved for partial summary judgment with regard to NL's causes of action for breach of contract and negligence.
Holditch moved for summary judgment as to all of NL's claims against it.
The trial court granted GHR's motion, and dismissed all of NL's claims
against GHR, even those not addressed by GHR's motion. 278 The court
also granted Holditch's motion. 279 NL appealed.
NL complained on appeal first that the trial court erred in dismissing
NL's fraud and mutual mistake claims against GHR, because GHR's motion was not directed to such claims. The appellate court agreed. The court
noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) 280 permits a court to grant
summary judgment in favor of a party that did not request it, but only "upon
274. Id. at 458.

275. Id.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280,

940 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 1, 1991).
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1174 (West 1979).
940 F.2d at 963.
Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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proper notice to the adverse party. '28 1 Because NL did not receive notice
that the trial court was considering dismissing NL's fraud and mutual mistake claims against GHR, the court held that the dismissal of those claims
was improper, reversing and remanding such causes of action to the trial
282

court.

NL next complained of error in the granting of GHR's motion for summary judgment with regard to its breach of contract claims. NL asserted
that GHR breached the workover agreement in three respects: (1) by failing to design the formation stimulation program based upon a model prepared by Holditch; (2) by failing to obtain required economic certifications
that the revenue created by the enhancement procedures would exceed the
cost of such procedures; and (3) by failing to obtain Holditch's approval of
the design for three of the ten proposed formation stimulation programs.
Among other defenses, GHR contended that its contract with NL stated
that as for all claims arising under the workover agreement, NL must look
exclusively to the incremental net revenue from the wells, and, in the event
this revenue is insufficient, that NL would have no recourse against GHR.
The court examined the relevant provision and concluded that it was in the
nature of a "production payment clause," which gave NL a share of the
minerals produced from the land, but did not prevent NL from recovering
28 3
damages if GHR breached the contract.
The court then addressed NL's claim that GHR breached the workover
agreement by not designing its fracture treatments in a manner consistent
with the "Holditch Model." According to NL, the "Holditch Model" is a
concept for fracturing wells, under which the length of the fracture is specifically tailored to the well's drainage area and reservoir permeability. NL
claimed that the fracture treatments designed by GHR did not conform to
the Holditch Model in that they were experimental and not individually
designed for each particular well. GHR responded that the contract did not
refer to any particular Holditch Model and, in any event, the fracture treatments were designed by a computer program developed and sold by
Holditch. The appellate court found that the contract provision at issue was
ambiguous, 28 4 and that factual issues as to the parties' intent precluded sum2 85
mary judgment.
As to NL's claim that GHR breached the workover agreement by failing
to submit three of ten designs to Holditch for review and approval, the court
281. 940 F.2d at 965 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Garrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986)).

282. Id. at 966.
283. Id. at 268. In this regard, the court stated:
The owner or operator of a ... well must protect the interest of the owner of a
production payment or an overriding royalty, particularly in a case such as this,
in which the entire reimbursement for NL's services was to come from the production payment. If the owner or operator of the ... well does something to
diminish the value of the mineral interest, the owner of a production payment or
an overriding royalty can sue for damages.
Id. (citations omitted).
284. Id. at 969.
285. Id.
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of appeals affirmed a summary judgment for GHR. 28 6 The court noted that
the workover agreement provided that, in the event NL did not receive an
approved fracture program, NL was required to notify GHR. 2 7 The contract further provided that NL was not to perform the fracture work if GHR
failed to respond to such notification within ten days. 288 The court concluded that absent such notification by NL to GHR, any injury NL suffered
by GHR's failure to obtain Holditch's approval was caused by NL's own
breach of the agreement. 28 9 The court also affirmed summary judgment as
to NL's claim that GHR breached the agreement by failing to obtain certification of the economic viability of each workover. 29° Again, turning to the
provisions of the contract, the court noted that the certifications were required to be provided to third parties and not to NL. 29 1 According to the
292
court, if GHR breached the contract in that regard, NL was not harmed.
With regard to NL's negligence claims, the court of appeals affirmed the
summary judgment on the basis of a provision in the workover agreement
that required GHR to submit its fracture designs to Holditch for review,
authorized Holditch to modify GHR's designs, and provided that any decisions made by Holditch with regard to such designs would be final and binding upon GHR and NL. 293 The court found that such provision appointed
Holditch to be an arbiter for the design of the fracture treatments for the ten
wells. 294 Under Texas law, an arbiter's decision is final and conclusive unless the arbiter is guilty of fraud, misconduct, or such gross mistake as would
imply bad faith or failure to exercise an honest judgment. 295 Consequently,
the appellate court held that Holditch could not be liable to NL on a simple
negligence theory. 296 The court also found that this provision shielded
297
GHR from liability on claims for negligent design.
The decision in Maxvill-Glasco Drilling Co., Inc. v. Royal Oil & Gas
Corp.298 involved claims by a lessee against a third-party for tortious interference with the lessee's oil, gas, and mineral lease. Maxvill was the lessee
under an oil, gas, and mineral lease covering 80 acres out of a 320 acre tract
from a depth of -9650' to -9800'. The lease required Maxvill to commence
drilling a well on the lease premises on or before August 23, 1982. Royal
286. Id. at 970.
287. Id.

288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.

292. Id.
293. Id.

294. Id.
295. Id. at 964 (citing, inter alia, City of San Antonio v. McKenzie Constr. Co., 136 Tex.
315, 326, 150 S.W.2d 989, 996 (1941)).

296. Id.
297. Id. at 970. "If NL were permitted to argue that GHR did not use reasonable care in
designing the fracs even though the designs conformed to the requirements of the contract,
Holditch's role would be nugatory because its decision to approve those treatments would be
meaningless." Id.
1977)).

(citing Huey v. Davis, 556 S.W.2d 860, 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin

298. 800 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
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held an oil, gas, and mineral lease covering the 320 acre tract in its entirety
from a depth of -7000' to -9650'. On August 4, 1982, Maxvill obtained a
permit from the Texas Railroad Commission to drill a well on its 80 acre
tract. Royal filed a protest with the Commission seeking to cancel this permit. On August 23, 1982, Royal withdrew its protest, but because Maxvill
had not yet commenced the drilling of a well on that date, its 80 acre lease
expired. Royal subsequently obtained a lease covering the same 80 acre tract
formerly leased to Maxvill from -9650' to -9800'. Royal then drilled and
completed a producing well at the same location and to the same depth for
which Maxvill had previously obtained its permit from the Commission and
thereafter began producing oil and gas from that well.
Maxvill filed suit against Royal, claiming that Royal's protest to the Commission constituted a tortious interference with Maxvill's oil, gas, and mineral lease because Royal's protest had prevented Maxvill from drilling its
planned well prior to the expiration of its lease. The trial court granted a
directed verdict for Royal on the grounds that Maxvill had failed to prove
any recoverable damages. 299 Maxvill appealed.
The court of appeals began its analysis by recognizing that the measure of
damages for tortious interference with a contract requires the court to put
the plaintiff in the same economic position he would have been in had there
been no interference with the contract. 300 In this case, Maxvill sought to
recover the "net profits" that it lost due to Royal's alleged tortious interference with Maxvill's oil, gas, and mineral lease. 301 In order to recover for
"lost profits," the court of appeals noted that sufficient evidence must be
presented to enable the jury to determine the net amount of those lost profits
with reasonable certainty.3 0 2 In this case, Maxvill presented only evidence
of gross profits in the form of the total proceeds from production, and did
not present evidence regarding costs associated with operation of the well
that generated the gross profits. 30 3 In the absence of evidence establishing
the cost of producing the oil and gas in question, the court held that there
was no evidence from which the jury could determine the amount of "net
profits" which Maxvill may have been entitled to recover, and affirmed the
3 °4
trial court's directed verdict.
Wilson v. United Texas Transmission Co. 30 5 involved claims by a lessor
against two gas purchasers for conversion of gas royalties. Wilson granted
an oil, gas, and mineral lease in 1981, which provided for 1/4 royalty. The
working interest under the lease was ultimately assigned to Clover Energy
Corp. The lease was pooled into two separate gas units, and Clover entered
into separate gas purchase contracts with United Texas Transmission Com299. Id. at 386.
300. Id.

301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 387.
304. Id.
305. 797 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
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pany (UTTCO) and South Gulf Energy, Inc. for the sale of gas produced
from such units.
Wilson sued UTTCO and South Gulf, claiming that they failed to provide
him with an accounting, and failed to pay him, for his share of royalty gas
produced from the lease for a certain ten month period. 3° 6 Wilson claimed
that no one ever submitted any proposed agreement to him regarding the
sale of gas produced from the lease, and he never authorized anyone to sell
such gas. According to Wilson, UTTCO and South Gulf converted his royalty gas since they purchased such gas from Clover, which did not have
Wilson's authority to sell such gas. The trial court, however, disagreed with
30 7
Wilson's analysis, and granted summary judgment for the gas purchasers.
This judgment was affirmed on appeal.
After examining the entirety of the royalty provision 30 8 in the Wilson
lease, the appellate court determined that the parties intended that the gas
royalties were to be paid in money rather than in kind. 3
The appellate
court then turned to settled Texas law, which holds that where royalty is
payable in money and the lessee fails to pay the royalty, the lessor does not
have an action against a party who purchases the gas unless the purchaser
has contracted to pay the royalties to the lessor. 310 Since the gas purchase
contracts at issue did not require UTTCO or South Gulf to pay royalties to
Wilson, the court concluded that Wilson could not maintain a cause of ac3 11
tion for conversion against either purchaser.
Trevor Rees-Jones, Trustee for Atkins Petroleum Corp. v. Trevor ReesJones, Trusteefor Apache Services, Inc.31 2 is a case involving the propriety of
a summary judgment granted for lien claimants against working interest
owners in certain oil, gas, and mineral leases. In 1985, Atkins Petroleum
Corporation owned 100% of the working interest in the leases at issue. In
January of 1986, Atkins contracted for services and materials to be furnished
by appellees in connection with the drilling of oil and gas wells on the leases.
Atkins thereafter entered into a series of letter agreements with appellants to
sell them mineral interests in the leases. In the letter agreements, the appel306. Wilson's claims were based on a provision of the lease which stated: "LESSEE may
dispose of LESSOR'S royalty gas or gaseous hydrocarbons in accordance with any proposed
agreement submitted to LESSOR by LESSEE and approved by LESSOR; and thereafter during the life of such agreement LESSEE shall account to LESSOR for said royalty gas on the
basis of such agreement." Id. at 233 (emphasis omitted).

307. Id. at 232.
308. The court focused on that portion of the gas royalty provision that provided the royalties reserved by lessor, and which shall be paid by lessee, are:
(c) on dry gas or residue gas the value of one-fourth (1/4) part of such dry gas
or residue gas sold or utilized by LESSEE on or off the premises, less severance
and production taxes. The value of such gas is to be based upon the highest
market price paid or offered in the general area; or that price which LESSEE
recieves (sic) for his gas, whichever is greater ....

Id. at 234.

309. Id.
310. Id. (citing Curry v. Texas Co., 8 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1928,
writ dism'd)).

311. Id.

312. 799 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
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lants agreed to buy the interests for a specified sum per well to be drilled. If
production was obtained, Atkins agreed to assign the appellants specified
portions of the working interest. Atkins was to be operator of the producing
wells.
In accordance with the contracts, appellees supplied materials and services for the drilling of wells. Apparently, production was established from
the wells, because between March and July of 1986, Atkins executed and
recorded a series of assignments of working interest to appellants in accordance with the terms of the letter agreements. Atkins, however, failed to pay
appellees for the materials and services they furnished. Appellees then filed
their lien affidavits and gave notice to Atkins, but not to appellants, even
though they had notice that some interest in the leasehold estate had been
assigned to appellants at the time they filed their lien affidavits. Appellees
then filed suit against appellants, and obtained summary judgment against
313
them for the value of their liens.
On appeal, the appellants claimed that the appellees had failed to comply
with certain requirements in the Texas Property Code regarding liens on
mineral interests.3 14 First, appellants contended that they were the mineral
property owners, 315 that Atkins was the mineral contractor, 31 6 that the appellees were mineral subcontractors,3 1 7 and that appellees had failed to provide the statutory notice of their claim required of mineral
subcontractors. 318 The court rejected this argument, noting that the contracts for materials and services were made with Atkins at a time when it
owned all of the working interests. 31 9 The court, therefore, held that Atkins
was the mineral owner and the appellees were mineral contractors, not subcontractors, at the time the contracts for materials and services were made,
and that events involving the mineral owner and its assignees after the contracts for materials and services were made could not affect the status of the
parties.3 20 Having concluded that appellees were contractors, rather than
subcontractors, the court held that the only notice that they were required to
give under the statute was notice to Atkins, even though they had notice that
313. Id. at 264-65.
314. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 56.001-.045 (Vernon 1984).

315. "Mineral property owner means an owner of land, an oil, gas, or other mineral lease§ 56.001(3).

hold, an oil or gas pipeline, or an oil or gas pipeline right-of-way." Id.

316. "'Mineral contractor' means a person who performs labor or furnishes or hauls material, machinery, or supplies used in mineral activities under an express or implied contract
with a mineral property owner or with a trustee, agent, or receiver of a mineral property
owner." Id. § 56.001(2).
317. "'Mineral subcontractor'" means a person who:
(A) furnishes or hauls material, machinery, or supplies used in mineral activities under
contract with a mineral contractor or with a subcontractor;
(B) performs labor used in mineral activities under contract with a mineral contractor; or
(C) performs labor used in mineral activities as an artisan or day laborer employed by a
subcontractor."
Id. § 56.001(4).
318. See id. § 56.021.
319. 799 S.W.2d at 465.
320. Id. at 466.
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some of the interest had been assigned to appellants. 32'
Second, appellants claimed that some of the lien affidavits at issue failed to
satisfy the statutory requirements 322 because the affidavits did not list the
appellants as the mineral property owners and because the property description in the affidavit was insufficient. With regard to the identification of the
mineral owners, the court held that appellants were not required to be listed
as mineral property owners as the result of its previous ruling that Atkins
was the mineral owner as to the lien claims at issue.3 2 3 Regarding description of the lease, the court recognized that the lien affidavit must contain a
description of the land or the lease. 324 After examining the affidavits at is-

sue, the court concluded that the property descriptions were adequate because each affidavit used survey descriptions to identify the lease. 325 The
court held that this type of description substantially complied with the statutory requirements.326
Shelton v. Exxon Corp.327 arose out of a settlement of royalty claims be-

tween King Ranch and Exxon. Until 1977, Robert Shelton was the executive vice president, treasurer, and member of the board of directors of King
Ranch. He was also King Ranch's largest shareholder. In 1976 and 1977,
Shelton exchanged his stock for various assets of King Ranch, including royalty interest and mineral interest, which were conveyed to Shelton and his
various corporations, including Shelton Ranch Corporation, Shelton Interests, Shelton Ranches, and Shelton Land & Cattle.
In the 1970s, royalties paid by Exxon were a large portion of King
Ranch's net income. During that period, Shelton urged King Ranch management to audit Exxon's accounting. When King Ranch conducted such
an audit, it discovered that Exxon had not paid all royalties due. King
Ranch's total claims for underpayment of royalty were estimated to be
worth $500 million. One of the non-executive mineral interests conveyed to
Shelton Land & Cattle included an assignment of 11.22% interest in King
Ranch's pending claim against Exxon for underpayment of royalty.
321. Id.

322. (a) A lien claimant's affidavit must include:
(1) the name of the mineral property owner involved, if known;
(2) the name and mailing address of the claimant;
(3) the dates of performance or furnishing;
(4) a description of the land, leasehold interest, pipeline, or pipeline right-of-way involved; and
(5) an itemized list of amounts claimed.
(b) A mineral subcontractor's affidavit must in addition include:
(1) the name of the person for whom labor was performed or material was furnished or
hauled; and
(2) a statement that the subcontractor timely served written notice that the lien is claimed
on the property owner or the owner's agent, representative, or receiver.
TEX. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 56.022 (Vernon 1984).
323. 799 S.W.2d at 466-67.
324. Id.
325. Id. For example, one affidavit described the leasehold estate as located in the SW/4 of
SE/4 of Section 43, Block 39, T-5-S, T. & P. R. R. Co. Survey, Upton County, Texas. Id.
326. Id.
327. 921 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1991).
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Shelton urged King Ranch to sue Exxon for the deficiency, but King
Ranch refused. Shelton then filed suit against Exxon and King Ranch in
state court. In 1980, King Ranch and Exxon settled the royalty dispute, and
entered into a settlement agreement purporting to release all claims, including Shelton's, for deficiencies in royalty accruing prior to September 1, 1980.
The agreement did not require Exxon to make a cash payment to King
Ranch. Instead, the parties agreed that King Ranch's royalty fraction under
its lease with Exxon would be increased from 1/6 to 9/48. This 1/48 increase was estimated to be worth $55 million. Shelton refused to accept his
share of the increased royalties.
Shelton's lawsuit was eventually tried as a diversity case in federal district
court. 328 At trial, Shelton claimed underpayment of royalty for two periods.
For the period from July 1, 1973, through September 1, 1980, Shelton asserted that the 1980 settlement agreement did not release claims against Exxon arising before settlement. The district court, however, disagreed, finding
that the settlement agreement by its express terms did release Shelton's claim
329
against Exxon, and that King Ranch was authorized to settle such claims.
For the period from September 1, 1980, through December 31, 1984,
Shelton claimed that the settlement agreement did not release Shelton's
claim against Exxon for failure to prudently market King Ranch gas, and
that Exxon imprudently marketed the gas. The district court agreed with
this claim and awarded Shelton approximately $11 million in actual damages, plus additional amounts for attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest. 330 Shelton appealed the district court's judgment with regard to the first
period, and Exxon appealed the judgment as to the second period.
The resolution of the issues involved in Shelton's claim relating to the
period from July 1, 1973, through September 1, 1980, required the Fifth
Circuit court of appeals to examine the specific language of the convey-

328. 668 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Tex. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 843 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.
1988), on remand, 719 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Tex 1989).
329. 719 F. Supp. 537, 544-45.
330. Id. at 547-50.
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ances 33 1 to Shelton and his corporations and the settlement agreement.3 32
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the trial court that these provisions in these
documents authorized King Ranch to settle the underpayment of royalty
claims against Exxon on behalf of the Shelton entities. With regard to the
1977 assignment of claim, the appellate court noted that the language in the
assignment was unambiguous, and that Shelton Land & Cattle agreed with
the restrictions as part of the bargain. 333 According to the assignment,
Shelton Land & Cattle expressly agreed that King Ranch had the complete
authority to deal with the entirety of the claim, including the power to waive
the claim altogether. Therefore, Shelton Land & Cattle was held to be precluded by the assignment from pursuing any claim it may have against Ex33 4
xon for the period before the effective date of the settlement agreement.
With regard to the claims of the other Shelton entities, Shelton claimed
that the mineral and royalty deeds reserved to the King Ranch the executive
right to enforce lease obligations only as to King Ranch's interests in the
leases, and not to Shelton's interest in underpaid royalties. Shelton reasoned
that the executive right is an interest in real property and pertains only to
interest in real property, whereas his claims for royalties on past production
were claims to recover personal property, and therefore were not covered by
the executive right. The Fifth Circuit recognized that the Texas supreme
court held that the executive right is a property interest, subject to the prin331. The 1977 assignment to Shelton Land & Cattle of 11.22% in King Ranch's pending
claim against Exxon contained the following provision:
The assignment is subject, and Assignee [Shelton Land & Cattle] by its acceptance hereof and joinder herein acknowledges and agrees for itself .... to the
retention by Assignor [King Ranch] of the exclusive, full, complete and absolute
right and power to prosecute and otherwise deal with any Claim for Additional
Royalties in any way Assignor ... see[s] fit, including without limitation the
absolute right to waive any Claim for Additional Royalties in its entirety, all
without liability to Assignee by reason of such actions; .... Assignee shall not be
entitled to any payment from Assignor if Assignor shall make settlement of the
Claimfor AdditionalRoyalties which involves a prospective increase in the royalty
or other benefit which inures directly to all owners of mineral interests subject to
the Leases in proportion to their respective ownership interests.
921 F.2d at 598 (emphasis added by court). The conveyances of mineral interests and royalty
interests to the other Shelton entities included language the same as, or similar to, the following provision:
King Ranch, Inc., Grantor herein, hereby reserves unto itself ... the exclusive
power and right, without the joinder of the Grantees herein, to execute amendments to the Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease of Exxon Corporation now covering
the lands described herein ....

Grantor...

shall have the exclusive right to

enforce the obligations of such existing or future leases, contracts, and other instruments and to contract and negotiatewith the lessee thereunderwith respect to
each such obligation.
Id. at 598-99 (emphasis added by court).
332. The settlement agreement between King Ranch and Exxon provided in part:
Ranch Interests hereby release Exxon from any and all claims, causes of action
and liabilities which have arisen or accrued prior to the effective date of this
Settlement Agreement [April 1, 1980] relating to the amount of royalty payable,
paid or which should have been paid under the provisions of The Leases ....
Id. at 597.
333. Id. at 598.
334. Id.
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ciples of property law when bundled with other rights and attributes comprising the mineral estate. 335 The court, however, disagreed with Shelton's
argument that the executive right encompasses only rights relating to realty. 336 Noting that the mineral estate consists of a bundle of interests that
can be separated, conveyed, or reserved upon any terms the mineral owner
deems proper, the court turned to the express language of the mineral and
royalty deeds, and determined that King Ranch expressly reserved for itself
the right to enforce lease obligations. 33 7 The court further found that even if
accrued royalties were classified as personalty, the duty to pay royalty is still
an obligation of the lease. 33 8 The court therefore concluded that King
Ranch had the authority to settle the claims against Exxon as to Shelton's
interest for the period from July 1, 1973, through September 1, 1980, and
that King Ranch did settle such claims under the 1980 settlement
3 39
agreement.
Prior to addressing Shelton's claim with regard to the second period at
issue, the Fifth Circuit discussed Shelton's allegations that even if King
Ranch had the right to settle Shelton's claims, King Ranch could only act as
Shelton's agent. According to Shelton, the settlement agreement between
King Ranch and Exxon was invalid as to his interest because of a conflict of
interest between King Ranch and Shelton, or because King Ranch had no
authority to act as Shelton's agent over Shelton's objections. The court
found that King Ranch did owe some duty to Shelton, and held that the
scope of that duty was similar to the duty owed by an executive to a nonexecutive. 34° Relying on the Texas supreme court case of Manges v.
Guerra34 1 the federal court noted that such duty required the executive to
acquire for the non-executive every benefit that it exacts for itself.34 2 Accordingly, King Ranch would have violated the executive's duty to act with
utmost good faith if it manipulated the settlement terms to its own advantage in order to obtain benefits not shared by the non-executives. 34 3 The
Fifth Circuit, however, agreed with the district court's conclusion 344 that
King Ranch fulfilled its duty, because it obtained for all mineral and royalty
interest owners the same consideration for release of the claim.345
With regard to the second period at issue, from September 1, 1980,
through December 31, 1984, Shelton claimed that Exxon imprudently marketed the King Ranch gas in the period leading up to the enactment of the
NGPA,3 46 and that its damages for such imprudent marketing continued to
335. Id. at 599 (citing Day & Co. v. Texiand Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex.
1990)).
336. Id. at 599-600.

337. Id. at 600.
338. Id. at 599.
339. Id. at 600.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

Id.
673 S.W.2d 180, 193 (Tex. 1984).
921 F.2d at 600.
Id.
719 F. Supp. 537, 545.
921 F.2d at 600.
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301-3432 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).

2010

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

accrue after execution of the settlement agreement between King Ranch and
Exxon. Shelton contended that Exxon should have stopped marketing gas
to corporate customers under long-term contracts subject to the NGPA section 109347 ceiling price. Instead, Shelton argued that Exxon should have
sold gas to other customers so as to qualify for a higher ceiling price under
NGPA section 105(b)(2). 348 Exxon countered that (1) the 1980 settlement
agreement released any imprudent marketing claims, and (2) in any event,
Exxon acted as a reasonably prudent operator in marketing King Ranch gas.
The appellate court did not reach Exxon's second contention because it
found that the settlement agreement did release the imprudent marketing
claims. According to the court, any such claims would have accrued in 1978
when the facts came into existence that would entitle Shelton to bring
suit. 349 The possibility that damages arose only after the effective date of the
settlement agreement was held to be irrelevant with regard to the accrual of
any such claim. 350 Although the settlement agreement did not specifically
provide for the release of imprudent marketing claims, the Fifth Circuit held
that the broadly-worded release provision in the agreement released all
claims, including imprudent marketing claims, that accrued prior to the effective date of the settlement agreement. 35 1 Accordingly, the court affirmed
in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment, resulting in a
favorable outcome to Exxon as to all claims. 352

347. Id. § 3319.

348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. § 3315.
921 F.2d at 602.
Id.
Id.

352. Id. at 603.

